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Introduction 
This paper contributes to the research on institution-based view of internationalization 
determined by the distance in home and host country development. We examine the differential 
effects of regulative, cognitive and normative distance on ownership strategies of Russian firms.  
Traditionally, all papers on outward investment have been predominantly focused on 
internationalization strategies of firms from developed markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000). 
However, as EMFs are more and more actively engaging in worldwide investment, they are 
attracting much attention of scholars. Although significant number of studies are devoted to 
motivations of EMFs and volume of investments (e.g. number of M&A, amount of investments), 
little attention is paid to ownership strategies of emerging market firms, such as modes of entry 
and ownership stake in foreign subsidiary (Yang & Hyland, 2012). This paper focuses on such 
under-studied strategic decision as level of ownership participation in cross-border corporate 
deals of Russian companies.  
Ownership participation of a company in international corporate deal is a critical strategic 
decision which determines firm’ success and survival. A poor choice of ownership strategy often 
results in mismatch in resource commitment between target and acquiring firms and incompetent 
integration (Lahiri et al, 2012). Prior literature on corporate deals of emerging firms has largely 
been focused exclusively on M&A (Yang, 2015; Panibratov et al, 2015) or choice between 
partial or full acquisition (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007).  Studies on institutional determinants and 
ownership strategies of internationalizing companies have demonstrated significant relationship 
(Contractor, et al., 2014; Tihanyi et al., 2005).  
Research problem, objectives and delimitation 
This paper is aimed to fill the gap in theoretical and applied knowledge on impact of 
differences in home-host country institutional environment on ownership strategies of Russian 
firms as well as to identify whether institutional factors that influence ownership strategies of 
Russian firms in developed and emerging countries differ. After an extensive literature review 
across leading academic journals, we can conclude that this paper is the first quantitive research 
that is focused on the influence of institutional distance on ownership strategies of EMFs within 
Russian context. The study expands research on emerging economies testing and adapting 
variables that influence ownership strategies of EMFs. 
The research questions are stated as follows: 
• What factors influence ownership-related decisions of Russian firms in the 
process of internationalization? 
• To which extent do the factors that influence ownership strategies of Russian 
firms in developed and emerging countries differ?  
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This research has a goal to investigate how institutional distance influences ownership 
strategies of Russian companies in the process of their internationalization. The main tasks of 
this paper are the following: 
• Analyze types and direction of influence of institutional distance on ownership strategies; 
• Identify set of variables for measuring regulatory, normative and cognitive distance 
between home and host market; 
• Find out differences in factors that influence ownership-related decisions of Russian 
companies in developed and emerging economies. 
The subject of the study is the relation between institutional distance and ownership 
strategies of Russian companies in the process of internationalization. The object of the study are 
international corporate deals of Russian companies. 
Research methodology and organization of the study 
The research method of the paper is empirical study. The data on internalization patterns 
of Russian company, in particular market entry methods, will be collected from such databases 
as ZEPHYR Bureau van Dijk, Thomson Reuters, Marketline. Then the variables measuring LOF 
drivers will be proposed. Statistical methods will be used (regression analysis, cluster analysis, 
factor analysis) in order to test the main hypothesis of the study. 
The study is organized in the following way. Firstly, the literature review on institutional 
distance concept is presented with a particular focus on the influence of institutional distance on 
ownership strategies. Then the research method is explained. After that the hypothesis are stated 
and tested, the main conclusions are made. Finally, the main findings, scientific contribution of 
the study, theoretical and managerial applications as well as the limitations are discussed.  
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1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Internationalization theories 
1.1.1 Internalization theory 
Internalization theory is a firm level theory. It determines the motive behind the firm’s 
decision to establish its own production facilities instead of cooperation with local firms in 
destination country. According to Hymer (1970), MNCs have to adapt to local environment in 
each country and coordinate their activities across various subsidiaries around the world, 
stimulating flows of information between them. A firm can maximize profits if it integrates 
business activities in different «imperfect» markets.  The optimum size of the form is where the 
costs and benefits of further internalization equals the margin. This choice is defined by owners, 
managers of enterprises and based on internal information flows between «internal markets» of 
the enterprises. Two types of internalization re distinguished by Buckley and Casson (2009): 
operational and knowledge internalization. The authors state that acquires are inclined to 
internalize intangible assets of the target in case of overseas acquisitions. 
1.1.2 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction Cost Theory is based on two main assumptions: bounded rationality of 
economic agents and likelihood of opportunistic behavior of economic agents (Williamson, 
1981). Due to uncertainty and complexity of world economics and information asymmetries 
(Dosi, 1988), individuals tend to pursue non-rational goals instead of undertaking rational 
actions, such as maximizing profits. The object of analysis in TCT is transaction which is 
defined as an event which occurs when a good or service is transferred across technologically 
separable interface within the frame of contractual relationship, implying concessions among 
agents involved. The relationships may be inter- or intra-firm (Williamson, 1985). The 
transaction is characterized by three intrinsic attributes: frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity (Williamson, 1981). Limited rationality of economic agents leads to the situation 
when they are not able to make agreements which can predict and adjust measures for all 
transactions that may take place in the future. The theory puts emphasis on efficiency of 
transactions between different production facilities and their transaction costs as the basis for 
choice between internalization and use of markets (Coase, 1937). 
1.1.3 Eclectic paradigm, or OLI framework 
Eclectic Paradigm developed by John Dunning (1977, 1981, 1988, 1998) is aimed to 
explain why MNCs exist and why they may be comparatively more successful than domestic 
firms (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1988). It is an approach which explains the motivations, location 
and way of development of cross-border production of MNCs through FDI. The eclectic 
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paradigm suggests that a firm should possess three types of advantages while internationalizing 
its activities: ownership (O), location (L) and internalization (I) advantages. The combination of 
all three types of advantages is preferable if MNC decides to enter foreign country through FDI 
rather than other modes of entry (Dunning, 1981). For instance, Dunning claims that prerequisite 
for establishing international production is the existence of ownership-specific advantage that 
can bring benefit to the company in case if it is transferred across national boundaries rather than 
sold. Herewith, ownership advantage means ownership of tangible (equipment, machinery) or 
intangible assets (knowledge, property rights, trademarks, licenses). Location advantage implies 
place or country chosen based on business opportunity to extract benefits from country’s 
resources. Internalization advantage is based on perceived advantage of integration of firm’s 
internal or cross-border market activities (Rugman, 2011). A tendency of the firm to internalize 
overseas makers of these and attractiveness of location for overseas production, as a rule, 
increases overseas production. Hence, this tendency will vary based on motives behind 
production activities: market-seeking, resource-seeking or efficiency seeking motive.  
Motives that companies pursue entering foreign market also affect the 
internationalization strategies of companies. Following the classification conceptualized by 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning & Lundan, 2008), companies from EMs have resource- 
and capability-seeking motives whereas DMFs pursue market- and efficiency-seeking motives. 
EMFs demonstrate gradual market commitment starting operations from exports and then 
moving to mergers with and acquisitions of small firms in DMs. This helps them to mitigate 
LOF by obtaining strategic resources.  
1.1.4 Uppsala theory of internalization 
The intellectual approach to internationalization of the firm constructed by Johanson and 
Wiederscheim-Paul accounts for attitudes and actual behavior of the firm. The authors state that 
firms start internationalization from local markets incrementally increasing resource 
commitment: no regular export, export through representatives, establishing wholly-owned sales 
subsidiaries and production facilities. Such approach is explained by the fact that firm gains 
information about foreign markets. It also implies that stage of internationalization influences 
perceived opportunities and risks, which subsequently affect firm’s decisions on resource 
commitment and current activities (Johanson &Vahlne, 1990). The theory was further expanded 
accommodated dynamics, processes of learning, organizational trust and level of commitment. 
However, the theory doesn’t explain inorganic growth strategies of foreign business operations. 
1.1.5 Resource-based-view (RBV) theory  
According to Penrose (1959) who is considered to be a pioneer of the RBV theory, there 
is direct relationship between different types of firm’s resources and ideas, knowledge and 
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experience of its managers and owners. Thus, resources become the basis for achieving 
competitive advantages (Grant, 1991). The firm needs to utilize its tangible and intangible 
resources, including firm-specific managerial resources to facilitate sustainable growth 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Specifically, resources need to be valuable, rare, difficult to imitate and 
irreplaceable. The differences in performance of firms are explained by the heterogeneity of 
firms’ resources (Barney, 1991). It is hypothesized that firms that possess significant advantage 
if other firms do not have such reproducible resources. In Rugman’s and Verbeke’s view, the 
ultimate goal of firm’s decisions in resource-based approach is to gain abnormal returns as 
compared to rivals. The internationalization of the firm is a common way to obtain exclusive 
resources through strategic alliances or acquisitions (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Moreover, they 
allow to create value as they increase economies of scale and/or scope, increase bargaining 
power over customers and suppliers (Barney, 1986). In other words, firms may grow much faster 
if they select inorganic strategies rather than organic. 
1.1.6 Liability of foreignness 
Liability of foreignness (LOF) is one of the well-established concepts of international 
business.  It presumes that companies incur additional economic and social costs when they 
internationalize. It has been initially introduced by Hymer (1976). He distinguishes four types of 
disadvantages the company has when entering foreign market as compared to local firms: 
• Lack of information: the company face costs of acquiring the information which 
domestic firms already have; 
• Foreign exchange currency fluctuation risk; 
• Host governments can undertake discriminatory measures to foreign firms so that 
the latter pay additional costs for establishing operations; 
• Home governments can also restrict companies’ foreign expansion.  
The firm-specific sources of LOF are named by Hymer (1976) as CDBA that stands for 
«cost of doing business abroad». These costs do not depend on the output, so they are considered 
to be fixed and they are supposed to diminish the longer the company operates in the foreign 
market. Moreover, they are much higher than the costs that domestic firms incur in their local 
market. 
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Figure 1 Costs of doing business abroad 
Source: Hymer (1976) 
In the figure above two rectangles (dark grey and grey) show the profit that the local 
firms earn, while blue one demonstrates the profit earned by MNEs in the host market, which is 
much lower due to the fact that MNE faces CDBA. The latter are illustrated by cost curve of 
MNE lying above the cost curve of the local firm (Wöcke & Moodley). In order to offset CBDA 
MNE need to have a firm-specific advantage, which either can facilitate sales growth or reduce 
costs. 
Some cultural and economic challenges can be eliminated over time, while other such as 
government discrimination remain longer and put the foreign firm in unfavorable position in 
comparison with local firms (Eden & Miller, 2004). 
Several scholars (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982) suggest their lists of 
additional costs, which can be associated with doing business abroad: 
• costs of resources, communications, management, host government 
discrimination; 
• costs of travel, communication, foreign exchange, lack of information about host 
country culture, institutions. 
Eden and Miller (2004) argue that LOF does not equal CDBA, but rather LOF is a key 
component of CBDA. The former refers to social costs the company incurs while operating 
abroad, in particular, costs of dealing with unfamiliarity, discriminatory and relational 
challenges. These challenges arise from institutional distance. CBDA concept embraces not only 
Price 
Costs of Doing Business Abroad (Lost profit) 
Local Firms' 
Average cost 
Marginal cost 
MNE's Average 
cost 
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social costs, but also economic costs such as cost of production, marketing and distribution, 
transportation, communications, foreign exchange, trade barriers. These activity-based costs can 
be easily measured, while social costs cannot be well anticipated and quantified, that is why LOF 
remains the key challenge in doing business abroad.  
The concept of LOF is closely related to the institutional distance (see figure below). 
Institutional distance results in LOF represented by unfamiliarity, relational and discrimination 
hazards that challenge the foreign firms’ legitimacy and increase costs of doing business. In 
order to mitigate the influence of these hazards, firms need to select appropriate ownership 
strategy in foreign market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Institutional Distance, Costs of Doing Business Abroad and Ownership Strategy 
Source: Eden and Miller (2004) 
According to Eden and Miller (2004), there are 3 hazards of LOF: 
• Unfamiliarity hazards. As the company lacks knowledge of the foreign market, it 
needs to incur additional costs of acquiring information about its environment.  LOF depends not 
on the age of the firm, but rather on how long the firm operates in the host environment.  
• Discrimination hazards. LOF needed to be viewed from two standpoints: 
unfamiliarity of the firm with host country environment and unfamiliarity of the host country 
with the foreign firm, which enters the market.  The latter results in versatile discriminatory 
treatment of the government (political prerequisites (Henisz &Williamson, 1999) or consumers 
(consumer ethnocentrism (Sundaram & Black, 1992)). So the company faces additional costs of 
gaining external legitimacy. 
• Relational hazards. There are two types of them. The first is intra-organizational 
costs. They are related to difficulties of managing people abroad: conflicting lines of authorities 
(Sundaram & Black, 1992), opportunistic behavior (Hennart, 2001), and different cultural 
backgrounds (Calhoun, 2002). Another kind of relational costs are inter-organizational costs, 
which refer to cost of doing business with other parties. They include costs of negotiations, 
Geographic distance Costs of Doing Business Abroad 
• Activity-based costs 
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o Unfamiliarity 
Hazards 
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Institutional distance 
• Regulatory 
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strategy 
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monitoring, dispute settlement and trust building. 
1.1.7 Institutional theory 
The action system of the society is defined by institutional matrix that consists of formal 
structure of delegation and control and a social structure (Selznick, 1948). Moreover, 
institutional rules influence organizational structures and their implementation and, 
subsequently, inter- and intra-firm relationships. 
Institutions are defined by Scott (1995) as «regulative, normative, and cognitive 
structures that provide stability and meaning to social behavior». Consequently, institutional 
theory refers to the influence of laws, regulations, the judicial system and socio-cultural values 
on decisions and behavior of the firm (North, 1990). There are two types of institutions that 
impact and control individual and society actions: formal (e.g., economic rules, political rules, 
including corruption, law enforcement, property rights protection, contracts adherence) and 
informal (e.g., ethical norms, customs, traditions, code of conduct). According to North, 
institutional regulations and provisions are particularly vital for overseas investment decisions 
and firm performance. Trevino et al. (2008) stated that institutionalization process could 
legitimize host market for a foreign investor, working through all three pillars: cognitive, 
regulative and normative. Moreover, Alfaro et al. (2008) stated that high level of institutional 
laws development could facilitate attraction of foreign investments and, in turn, utilization of 
these investments for achieving higher economic growth. 
Institutional theory, from sociological perspective, implies that institutional context, 
referring to the combination of rules, informal constraints and the way of their enforcement, 
predefines action patterns of the firms that may not reflect true economic efficiencies. It means 
that apart from securing survival and success firms need to gain legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Scott 
and Meyer (1994) suggest that an institutional model is comprised of several key elements. In 
particular, the origins of environmental rationalization influence the pattern of organizing. These 
origins result in particular dimensions of a rationalized environment, so that rules and ideologies 
describing organizational practices create grounds for continuous changes in and across 
organizations. These rules and ideologies lead to creation of specific mechanisms shaping 
organizations and their action patterns. Finally, each organization with its identity and action 
patterns is a result of institutional forces influencing it. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduce three types of institutional pressures: coercive, 
normative and mimetic. By responding to coercion, organizations illustrate procedural and 
structural isomorphism. Organizations functioning in the same institutional environment 
demonstrate structural similarities. This isomorphism influences organizations so that they aim 
to gain external legitimacy, rather than focus on internal efficiency. External assessment criteria 
		 15 
are employed in order to identify the value of structural elements. Reliance on external 
institutions reduces volatility and secures stability. Based on this typology of Meyer et al. (1991) 
states that regulatory pillar of institutional context reflect coercive pressures, normative 
corresponds to normative pressures and cognitive elaborates the concept of mimetic pressures. 
Institutional theory represents useful tool for explaining the choice of organization 
ownership strategy, as organizations have to gain and maintain legitimacy, thus selecting 
governance modes that can attenuate institutional pressures. First, the three pillars of institutional 
environment provide bases for obtaining legitimacy as organizations are rewarded if they deploy 
structures, policies and practices that are considered appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Second, institutional theory is 
contingent on cross-country differences in institutional factors. Although regulatory pillar has 
been integrated in transaction cost theory, it does not account for normative and cognitive 
institutional aspects. So, some governance mode decisions may be sensitive to various 
idiosyncratic institutional pressures, e.g., existing value systems, legal rules and cognitive 
practices. 
1.1.8 Institutional distance 
Initially, institutional distance was introduced by Johanson and Vahle (1977), Hofstede 
(1980), Kogut and Singh (1988) who sought to examine how the differences in economic 
development, languages, educational level and culture influence internationalization strategies of 
firms. Kostova (1996) tried to understand how home and host country institutional environments 
influence the transfer of practices from headquarters to subsidiaries, taking into account internal 
and external environment factors. After Kostova's publication, number of research devoted to 
internationalization of emerging market firms have emerged (Dikova & Wittloostujn, 2007; Peng 
et al, 2009).  
The study includes the discussion of cultural distance which indicates differences 
between home and host country (Hall, 1976, Kogut & Singh, 1988). The distance implies 
uncertainty that constraints flow of knowledge and information and increases costs of doing 
business abroad. 
Johanson and Vahlne (1977) have developed a concept of “psychic distance” in order to 
capture differences across countries and analyze adaptation of business to foreign institutions. 
The concept refers to combination of factors that impede information flow from home and host 
market and accommodates “differences in language, education, business practices, culture and 
industrial development” (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977).  Based on four Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions, Kogut and Singh (1988) suggested assessment of cultural distance. These 
dimensions include uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/feminity, power distance, 
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individualism/collectivism. These pillars were measure across IBM managers in 40 countries in 
the 1970s. Later the database was expanded to larger number of countries. However, the 
methodology was criticized due to the fact that the study was based on IBM corporate culture 
only. Another limitation is that the variables are static and do not change over time while cultural 
peculiarities of country population are constantly evolving.  Due to these limitations, empirical 
results based on the methodology is ambiguous and contradictory (Slangen & Hennart, 2007). 
Different scholars sought to approach the concept of institutional distance from various 
perspectives. Hennart and Larimo (1998) tried to account for cultural differences based on 
transaction cost theory. According to Ghemawat (2001), there are the following pillars of 
distance: 
• Geographic distance (physical distance between countries and the size of host 
market; 
• Economic distance (differences in market size, amount of natural, human, 
financial resources; purchasing power, access to knowledge); 
• Cultural distance (differences in languages, religion, norms, values); 
• Institutional distance (differences in economic and political systems as well as 
colonial heritage).  
Generally, this literature refers to the influence of institutional distance on two aspects: 
• Gaining legitimacy in host market; 
• Possibility to transfer organizational practices (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
These scholars suggested extending the scope of the concept by trying to understand 
process of location and entry mode selection. New insights on the issues emphasized that 
cultural distance is only one of the pillars of institutional distance (Berry, et al., 2010), trying to 
integrate diversity of differences across countries. The table below illustrates of types of 
differences proposed by Berry et al. (2010). 
Table 1 Institutional distance dimensions 
Dimension of distance Definition 
Economic 
Differences in economic development and macroeconomic 
characteristics 
Financial Differences in financial sector development 
Political 
Differences in political stability, democracy and trade asociations 
membership 
Administrative Differences in colonial ties language, religion, legal system 
Cultural Differences in attitudes towards authority, trust, individuality, 
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balance between work and family 
Demographic Differences in demographic characteristics 
Knowledge Differences in patents and scientific development 
Connectedness Differences in tourism and internet usage 
Geographic Distance between capitals of counties 
Source: Berry et al (2010). 
However, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) truly contributed to research on influence of 
institutional distance on performance of firms in foreign markets by suggesting such dimensions 
of institutional distance as regulatory, cognitive and normative. Our research is based on their 
classification. 
Regulatory dimension presumes formal laws and regulations sanctioned by the 
government (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). They can be easily identified and interpreted by foreign 
firms. Normative dimension relates to the ideas and norms, which are considered legitimate in 
the society (Kostova, 1997). They are deeply rooted in culture and tacit, so they are opaque to 
foreign firms. Cognitive institutions refer to values, beliefs and mentality of people, their 
traditions, symbols, and stereotypes. 
There are two types of challenges that MNCs encounter abroad due to institutional 
distance. Firstly, embeddedness in different institutional contexts inhibits interaction between a 
company and its foreign subsidiary, thus impeding internal coordination and integration between 
them and, secondly, institutional pressures from home environment that impede adoption of 
host-country practices. 
1.1.9 Institutional distance and ownership strategies 
Variations in international business strategies and operations are traditionally explained 
by the concept of «distance». If the distance between home and host country is large, MNCs 
need to manage normative, regulatory and cognitive differences and choose appropriate 
ownership strategies, adjust organizational forms and practices to account for the differences 
(Johansen & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) decide on what ownership strategy to pursue in 
foreign subsidiary by examining such crucial considerations, as level of ownership control and 
resource commitment (Taylor & Zou, 1998; Delios & Beamish, 1999). Transaction cost theory 
suggests that uncertainty of host market environment impedes negotiating with and interpreting 
actions of foreign partners. Increased ownership control reduces transaction costs, thus, 
improving governance efficiency (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007; Yang, 2015). However, scholars 
suggest that in case when firms do not evaluate transaction costs they opt for lower ownership 
strategy in order to diversify investment risks in unfamiliar market (Zhao et al, 2004). 
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Consequently, institutional theory strives to improve entry strategy research serving as 
alternative framework for analysis of national differences (Martin, 2014). Institutional theory 
proponents claim that institutions provide rules of the game that companies should adhere to 
obtain legitimacy crucial for their survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Dissimilarities between 
home and host country environment leads to a situation when foreign firm faces threat of 
obtaining external legitimacy, selection of proper entry mode becomes crucial for mitigating the 
threat (Estrin et al, 2007).  
Entry modes choice implies diverse strategies ranging from modes with the lowest 
commitment such as exporting, licensing or franchising to the modes with the highest 
commitment such as foreign direct investment. FDI can be conducted in two ways. First way is 
to establish a production facility (Greenfield investment) or acquire already existing business 
(acquisition). Second decision refers to the issue whether the company establishes business alone 
or in cooperation with local partner. (Peng et al., 2008). Each mode of entry is characterized by 
particular level of commitment, control and property pursued by the firm. The availability and 
need for resources is another crucial issue which should be considered in order to reach strategic 
goals of the company (Meyer & Estrin, 2001). 
In academic literature on international management choice of entry mode is one of the 
major area of study (Werner, 2002). According to Cho and Padmanabhan (1995), studies are 
most commonly devoted to the two directions. The first type of research is aimed to examine 
factors which influence the choice between greenfield investments and acquissition (Hennart & 
Park, 1993; Brouther & Brouthers, 2000; Harzing, 2002; Larimo, 2003; Dikova & 
Witteloostuijin, 2007), the second seeks to analyze the decision whether to share control over 
operation by establishing joint venture or independent subsidiary.  
Li et al. (2012) strive to explain entry mode decisions of emerging-market firms into 
developed markets based on interorganizational imitation theory. They state that these firms pay 
particular differential attention to prior actions of reference groups – by type of country of origin 
and by entry mode. 
Despite theoretical development is this area, Slangen and Hennart (2007) claim that there 
is the need to construct theories which would explain factors determining choice on entry mode. 
Analytical frameworks proposed by scholars are dedicated primarily to firm-specific factors or 
industry-specific or both. However, there is a number of studies which analyze the influence of 
institutional environment on entry mode selection. Specifically, Estrin et al. (2009) have 
analyzed institutional distance based on North's classification. It is divided into two fundamental 
pillars: 
• Formal institutions which comprise set of rules with which economic actors have 
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to interact; 
• Informal institutions that refer to norms, values and beliefs shared by society. 
It is stated that institutional distance impact ownership strategy through 3 mechanisms. 
The first one is external isomorphic pressure, which results in adoption of lower level ownership 
strategies to gain legitimacy in a host market (Agarwal & Ramaswamy, 1991). Second, 
institutional distance accentuates liability of foreignness that refers to additional costs caused by 
discrimination and unfamiliarity hazards faced by foreign firms. One of the ways to mitigate 
liability of foreignness may be lower level of control over foreign operations (Eden & Miller, 
2004).  Third, MNE tend to deploy lower ownership strategies as institutional distance impedes 
knowledge and managerial practices transferability to foreign subsidiaries of a firm (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002). 
 To summarize, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) introduced three types of institutuional 
pressure: coercive, mimetic and normative. Agarwal and Ramaswamy (1991) stated that these 
pressures result in two challenges faced by the firm: attenuate legitimacy threat and to obtain 
governance efficiency. Further, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) suggested classification of three 
types of institutional distance that create institutional pressure: regulatory, cognitive and 
normative, respectively. So, in order to overcome challenges caused by institutional pressures, 
firms have to choose and pursue proper ownership strategies. Thus, based on institution-based 
view, we present the conception framework of this paper below. 
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Figure 3 Conceptual framework of Institutions and EMNCs' Ownership Strategy 
Source: Adopted from Liou et al. (2015); Agarwal & Ramaswamy  (1991); Kostova & 
Zaheer (1999); DiMaggio & Powell (1983) 
To sum up, it should be highlighted that many scholars in international business sought to 
explain internalization process of companies from different perspectives: transaction cost theory, 
resource-based view, eclectic paradigm, institutional theory etc. In this paper we draw upon the 
concept of institutional distance suggested by Kostova and Zaheer (1999). Institutional distance 
is a crucial issue in international business literature and has direct impact on internationalization 
process of companies. The success of overseas operations depends on decision on choice of 
entry mode of the company which reflects operating efficiency of foreign subsidiary and 
competitiveness of MNC (Cuervo-Cazuro & Narula, 2015). 
1.1.10 Institutional distance in Emerging and Developed markets 
Contemporary international trade is characterized by the following trends: growing 
internationalization of EMFS, regionalization of MNEs and rise of number of multilateral 
regional trade agreements (RTAs). 
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Emerging economies are defined as «low-income, rapid growth countries using economic 
liberalization as their primary engine for growth» (Hoskisson et al., 2000). They are 
characterized by undeveloped infrastructure and capital markets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
Nevertheless, they are very import part of global economy as they account for more than half of 
world’s population (Global Edge, 2006) and comprise 30% of world GDP and 45% of world’s 
exports. Prior literature on IB has been focused on research on developed country MNEs (e.g. 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, Rugman & Verbeke, 2004). Thus, EMFs global orientation is 
understudied. 
Due to international trade restrictions in emerging economies such as policies favoring 
import substitution over exports, preference for non-market approaches to economic growth, 
tariff barriers, they have latecomer status to internationalization and have to overcome obstacles 
that DMFs have overcome long ago (Luo & Tung, 2007; Ramamurti, 2009). However, 
governments in EM have been adopting greater openness and promotion of internationalization, 
partially due to greater competition from developed market firms which enter their home 
markets. 
Another major dissimilarity of EMFs from their developed markets counterparts is that 
they possess fewer firm-specific advantages that can provide competitive edge in 
internationalization, so they need to catch up and find new sources of advantage such as cost 
leadership (Aulakh et al. 2000). In order to catch up, they frequently leapfrog some stages of 
internationalization, trying to compensate asset gaps and latecomer status disadvantages (Luo & 
Tung, 2007). That is why there are eager to obtain cutting-edge technologies and best practices 
or draw on home-specific advantages such as low labor costs or preferential access to rich base 
of natural resources. 
Thirdly, there are institutional constraints that EMFs encounter in their home markets 
such as property rights protection and law enforcement, poor developed infrastructure, 
corruption, limited market size, political instability. These limitations raise the costs and risks of 
doing business, while creating greater volatility. 
Some scholars addressed the ownership strategies of EMFs either in developed or 
emerging countries. For example, Li et al. (2012) strive to explain entry mode decisions of 
emerging-market firms into developed markets based on interorganizational imitation theory. 
They state that these firms pay particular differential attention to prior actions of reference 
groups – by type of country of origin and by entry mode. 
Delios and Henisz (2003) claimed that institutional distance is particularly critical for 
Western MNCs that enter emerging economies where regulatory environment impede 
international business. Legal regulations for market transactions are considered to be less 
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extensive, there may be inefficient law enforcement, especially with regard to property rights 
protection. In order to accommodate variations in institutional development forms needs to 
develop managerial practices and routines for collecting and interpreting information. Firms 
need to account for institutional differences in order to gain legitimacy in host market and 
transfer organizational practices and knowledge (Xu & Shenkar, 2003). The greater the 
difference between home and host countries, the more difficult the adaptation.  That is why 
emerging countries firms can overcome challenges of adaptation more easily when they enter 
similar institutional environment. Thus, we draw upon this line of argumentation and state that 
we need to examine institutional factors affecting ownership strategies of EMFs separately in 
emerging countries and developed countries. 
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Figure 4 Internationalization Paths and Liability of Foreignness  
Source: Gaur and Kumar (2011) 
As a rule, institutions are underdeveloped in emerging markets. So, companies there have 
to develop its political, organizational capabilities in order to compensate for disadvantages 
arising from lack of efficient institutions needed for market-based economic transactions. These 
capabilities can help companies to internationalize to other emerging markets with similar level 
of institutions development. Firms from developed markets may face lower LOF than firms from 
emerging markets. Additionally, as the difference in institution development between home and 
host country increases, LOF becomes higher. However, firms from developed countries have an 
advantage over emerging markets firms in this case, although the institutional distance is the 
same. This can be attributed to the fact that firms from DM build very strong brands and their 
products are often associated with inferior quality (Gaur & Kumar, 2011). Given the 
argumentation above and the fact that different levels of LOF result in pursue of different 
strategies, we state that ownership strategies of EMFs varies across develop and emerging 
economies. 
1.2 Hypothesis Development 
Institutional distance is defined as the extent of similarity or difference between home 
and host countries’ institutions (Kostova, 1997).  It results in barriers for an MNC to extract 
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benefits from internationalization to full extent (Dikova et al. 2010).  
Institutional theory suggests that ownership strategy of the company is influenced by 
difference of uncertainty between home and host country environment. Specifically, larger 
dissimilarity between institutional factors lead to lower ownership strategy in order the company 
could remain flexible if it faces investment risks (Brouthers & Hennart, 2007). Moreover, the 
company thus strives to mitigate risks of opportunistic behavior of partners, lack of knowledge 
about foreign market. Xu et al. (2004) have proved that larger institutional distance leads to 
lower ownership participation. Similarly, Dikova et al. (2010) have provided empirical evidence 
that there is less likelihood of cross-border M&A deal completion if the acquiring firm 
encounters larger formal and informal institutional distance.  
The majority of cross-border M&As studies focus on informal institutional distance to 
accommodate dissimilarity in regulatory environment, while national cultural differences are 
subject to informal institutional research (Dikova et al., 2010).  
Firms, which enter host market, need to gain legitimacy by responding to institutional 
pressure (Raaijmakers et al., 2015), it can be accomplished through the number of means. In 
order to respond to regulative pressures, such as regulations and laws which are explicitly 
codified and enforced by government agencies, and operate legally, a firm needs to adjust its 
practices to adhere to host country rules (Scott, 1995).  Following informal institutional 
requirements presents a greater challenge for foreign firms as they need to centralize coercive 
mechanism to gain legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Gaur and V. Kumar (2011) in one of the recently published articles strive to examine how 
firms entering foreign markets interact with home and host country environment based on 
concept of liability of foreignness. They state that LOF is derived from two sources. One source 
is home and host country environment-specific factors such as home and the host country 
governments, institutions, the nature and structure of industry and culture (Nachum, 2003).  
Larger institutional distance results in higher LOF, increasing additional cost of doing 
business in the host market (Bajk et al., 2013). Lack of knowledge about host market, 
relationships with the local firms, discrimination hazards lead to legitimacy threat for a foreign 
firm (Eden & Miller, 2004). In order to mitigate effect of LOF firms can cooperate with local 
partners with the existing external legitimacy and can provide necessary knowledge and access 
to the existing business network of suppliers and consumers (Xu et al, 2004).  
The choice of proper entry mode is a prerequisite for successful operations of the 
company in the host market. The entry method should allow to take the most of firm-specific 
advantages and to accommodate risks, which result from market uncertainty. Some scholars 
consider that companies need to choose and intermediary ownership strategy in foreign market 
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in order to overcome the LOF effect, to gain access to local resources and business networks, 
while other stand for the opinion that wholly owned subsidiaries decrease transaction costs 
(Dunning, 1988) and help firms to utilize their unique firm resources capabilities to the 
maximum extent possible (Hymer, 1976).  
However, from a dynamic perspective contemporary firms should go beyond the trade-
off of exploitation and exploration to sustain its competitive advantage (Hamel & Prahalad, 
1990). They should deploy its own resources while extracting benefits from external 
environment. 
Buckley and Casson (1998) developed a very comprehensive work linking economic 
costs to entry mode decision. They tried to predict which mode entry the company would choose 
taking into account cost of production abroad, transaction costs, production technology 
adaptation and information costs. However, they ignored socio-institutional costs. 
 Davis et al. (2000) argue that the decision on mode of entry is largely rely on tradeoff 
between local responsiveness and global integration. They found out that exporting helps to 
achieve the highest host-country isomorphism, while wholly owned subsidiaries mostly conform 
to parent -company practices.  
El Said and McDonald (2002) in their studies empathize importance of reliance on either 
formal or informal institutions when choosing the market entry strategy. In developed countries 
formal institutions are well established while in emerging countries they are, on the contrary, 
weak and the role of networks, trust is crucial there. That explains the reason, why foreign firms 
prefer to have local partners there.  
Xu and Shenkar (2002) propose that the higher the institutional distance between 
countries, the more likely that the foreign country would prefer low ownership strategy due to 
twin challenges of achieving external legitimacy and parent company isomorphism.  
Eden and Miller (2004) go further and examine influence of CDBA (not only economic, 
but also social costs) caused by institutional and geographic distances on ownership strategy that 
the company pursues. Ownership strategy refers to the percentage of equity the company hold in 
its foreign operations. 0% represents exporting while 100% - wholly owned subsidiary.  They 
suggest that MNEs should select the entry method which would minimize CDBA, both 
economic costs and costs resulting from LOF. As the activity-based costs can be easily identified 
and quantified, costs of dealing with LOF become decisive and determine the firm’s ownership 
strategy. They argue that as the institutional distance is increasing, the more likely that MNE 
would choose the lower level of market commitment. 
 If the regulatory institutions are weak (lack of intellectual property rights protection), 
then the inter-relational hazards are higher as foreign partners cannot be protected from 
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counterfeiting, opportunistic behavior of partners or intellectual piracy, so they will avoid 
intermediary strategies.  
Liou et al. (2016) state that higher informal distance (cognitive and normative) leads to 
low-ownership strategies, thus, alleviating legitimacy threat, while large formal institutional 
distance requires gaining of dominant ownership control. They also argue that home-market 
conditions such as market size and efficiency of regulatory bodies exert additional moderating 
effect. 
1.2.1 Regulative distance 
Regulatory pillar refers to rules and regulations that are taken for granted or supported by 
law enforcement or public opinion (Nystrom, 1976) which are aimed at encouraging certain 
behaviors and discouraging other. Regulatory pillar corresponds to coercive mechanisms that are 
typically enforced by a powerful actor in order to secure compliance and are associated with 
resource interdependence, state-sponsored legitimacy, governmental mandate and subtle political 
processes. Firms undertake actions that establish and enhance their legitimacy, making them 
adhere to prevailing regulations, rules and requirements (Oliver, 1991). 
Economic Freedom 
Economic freedom is frequently used as a measure of regulative environment in literature 
devoted the influence of institutional distance on market entry modes. It refers to lack of 
government constraints on production, distribution and consumption of goods and services. The 
Heritage Foundation has been capturing level of development of regulatory environment in 186 
countries by tracking time-variance index of economic freedom since 1995 (Johnson and 
Sheeny, 1996). 
Dissimilarity in level of economic freedom can be a source of uncertainty and result in 
additional costs for MNEs (Demirbag et al., 2011). These costs are caused by unfamiliarity 
hazards faced by MNE. Distance in level of economic freedom represents differences in strength 
of market economy institutions. Previous research indicates that if economic distance is high and 
a firm decides to conduct an acquisition, it may face government intervention in firm's activities 
and strategies due to differences in antitrust regulations (Estrin et al., 2009) as well as 
managerial problems. However, recent evidence on M&As deal provided by Contractor et al. 
Contractor et al. (2014) suggest that when EMFs face lower institutional distance they opt for 
minority acquisition over majority or full acquisition. The latter scholar focused on Chinese and 
Indian firms. In line with their findings we suggest to test the following hypothesis for Russian 
firms: 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the distance in Economic Freedom between Russia and a host 
market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
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There are two types of regulatory environment: less restrictive and more restrictive. In the 
first case, governments initiate policies that are based on trust and goodwill. In such environment 
civil and political rights as well as media interdependence are well protected, corruption is 
minimized and laws and regulations are respected. On the contrary, in more restrictive 
environments, laws are poorly enforced, legal protection is weak, policies and practices are 
ambiguous and immature, and governments are less effective.  
It is difficult to gain legitimacy in more restrictive institutional environments as it is 
complicated to overcome regulatory restrictions in such country-specific regulatory 
environments. In such environments, firms deploy lower ownership strategy, for example, by 
making partnerships with local partners. This allows to access knowledge about host country 
rules and regulations, thus mitigating liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995).  
However, firms originating from emerging are familiar with how to deal with regulatory 
unprotectability and inefficiencies in such markets. The capability of firms to cope with and 
capitalize on institutional voids represents a unique asset of EMFs that can utilize it in order to 
compete with multinationals in their home countries and in other emerging market (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2006). Operating in low information transparency environment, EMFs are more likely to 
adopt command structures in order to deal with high uncertainty.  
On the contrary, EMFs are not familiar with less restrictive environments. Although firms 
from developed markets which invest in emerging markets has provided some 
internationalization knowledge to EMFs, the latter have not gained any useful insights of how to 
deal with regulatory conditions in developed markets. So, inward investments do not curtail 
liability of foreignness of EMFs, particularly in developed markets (Luo & Tung, 2007). Seeking 
to learn fast how to cope with regulatory environment in advanced economies, EMFs would 
prefer to establish any kind of partnerships with local actors.  
However, this lack of experience may not obligatory lead to adoption of lower ownership 
stake of EMFs in the process of internationalization in developed markets. Emerging economies 
demonstrate totally different approaches to work culture and labor management as compared to 
developed countries. Managers of EMFs face bureaucratic approach in their home market, 
pervasive corruption, so they may be unable to adapt to highly competitive environment of 
developed markets. At the same time, reluctance of EMFs to adopt new organizational structures 
and practices in acquired firm in developed market can be even higher as their managerial 
approaches are inefficient, so adaptation complications discourage them from acquiring minority 
shares. 
Emerging countries have less strict requirements for listing and registration in a stork 
market of the companies, weaker protection of investor rights, less stringent accounting 
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standards (Marosi & Massound, 2008). So, entering of firms originating from emerging markets 
the markets with stronger regulative institutions can be beneficial for them and perceived as an 
opportunity to advance accounting standards and attract foreign investors. So, EMFs can be 
motivated to acquire majority stake.  
Hypothesis 1 a. The positive relationship between distance in Economic Freedom 
between Russia and a host market and the likelihood of adoption of higher ownership strategy is 
stronger in developed host markets than in emerging.  
Economic historians refer to economic freedom as a determinant of economic 
development, growth in different countries (North, 1990). It is argued that higher level of 
economic freedom is an important prerequisite for FDI inflows and should be developed by 
policy makers, especially, in emerging markets (Cole, 2003). Countries with greater economic 
freedom, which provide protection of private property and rights of foreign investors, receive 
increased FDI inflows and become destination for active MNEs' operations. It has been found 
out that in markets with higher investor protection, the likelihood of a firm to conduct an 
acquisition is higher. It is further enhanced by the flexibility allowed for required restructuring of 
acquired firm.  In order to encourage FDI, emerging markets need to remove restrictions on 
investments of foreign MNEs. If host countries secure favorable regulative context, MNEs tend 
to show more commitment.  
Political stability  
Political risk arises from political violence, government instability and impact of military 
coups and results in subsequent threat of property expropriation (Kobrin, 1979). More recent 
research also illustrates the risk of indirect expropriation as a result of checks and balances 
which represent institutional constraints (Henisz, 2000). 
Political instability is often another distinctive feature of more restrictive environment. 
Firms may opt for lower ownership in order to mitigate risks associated with political instability. 
One of the ways to do that is to acquire minority stake in a firm owned by local firm that 
possesses knowledge of how to cope with uncertainty caused by politically unstable 
environment.   
Political uncertainty results in frequent changes in industrial and economic policies, 
policies relating to property protection, thus, influencing on performance of business operations. 
These changes require alterations of firm's practices and increase costs of doing business abroad. 
Kotabe (2005) state that firms entering politically stable countries are more prone to invest more 
resources and conduct acquisitions rather than using collaborative ventures to minimize exposure 
of specific assets.  
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Holburn and Zelner (2010) state that political institutions in firm's home market have and 
impact on firm's ability to overcome political constraints in host markets. Firms originating from 
countries with weaker institutional constraints on policy-making possess an advantage at dealing 
with unfavorable policy outcomes as compared to their counterparts from countries with stronger 
institutional constraints. The main prerequisites for this advantage are processes of imprinting – 
utilization of representations of reality for interpreting environment and governing firm’s actions 
under conditions of uncertainty - and organizational learning. 
Hypothesis 2. The larger the distance in political stability between Russia and a host 
market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
Political capabilities of a firm from emerging countries help to reduce unpredictability 
associated with policy outcomes in countries with weak institutional constraints and, 
consequently, attenuate entry-deterring effect of host country policies. In addition, these firm-
specific capabilities may lead to firm’s superior performance and, thus, firms are more prone to 
commit more resource and, thus, use entry modes with higher level of control for entering other 
host countries with lower political stability.   
Hypothesis 2 a. The larger the distance in political stability between Russia and a 
developed host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
Hypothesis 2 b. The distance in political stability between Russia and an emerging host 
market will not impact ownership-related decisions of Russian firms. 
Doing Business  
We argue that we can measure distance in doing business in order to capture dissimilarity 
in regulatory quality and efficiency in Russia and a host market. No studies in international 
distance apply this measure for discussion of ownership-related decisions of firms in the process 
of internationalization. We state that Ease of Doing business covers aspects that can be crucial 
for a foreign investor in the process of selection proper ownership strategy for entering a 
particular market such as conditions for starting business, ease of getting versatile permissions, 
protection of property rights, registration of the business, labor market regulations etc. We 
believe that in host markets where business regulations are very complicated and cumbersome 
investors would prefer to transfer these bureaucratic issues on local counterparts, thus, choosing 
ownership strategies with lower commitment. So, we aim to assess significance of this factor.   
Hypothesis 3. The larger the distance in Doing business between Russia and a host 
market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
This measure from year to year also embraces new business reforms. As emerging 
markets are at the stages of rapid development they tend to introduce more new regulations that 
can be very unpredictable and sometimes even illogical. Thus, we suppose that in order to 
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attenuate the influence of the uncertainty Russian firms will be reluctant to commit more 
resources if the dissimilarity of these regulations is higher. 
Hypothesis 3 a. The larger the distance in Doing business between Russia and an 
emerging host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Developed markets, on the contrary are considered more stable and less restrictive, legal 
and economic regulations are already well-developed there, so foreign investors are unlikely face 
substantial shift in policy, thus we believe that this measure will have no influence on decisions 
regarding ownership strategies of Russian firms in developed markets. 
Hypothesis 3 b. The distance in Doing business between Russian and a host developed 
market will not impact ownership-related decisions of Russian firms. 
Corruption 
According to recent research (Slangen, Van Tulder, 2009), scholars emphasize the 
influence of host country governance structure on ownership strategies. One of the most 
important dimensions of this infrastructure is corruption that has broad effect on the economy.  
Such dimension of institutional distance as corruption was first introduced by Habib and 
Zurawicki (2002) who found out that corruption distance had negative correlation with FDI. 
Demirbag et al. was the first scholar who examined the influence of corruption distance on entry 
modes. This study presented evidence on higher likelihood of establishment of joint ventures in 
case of greater corruption distance. Based on data from Central and Eastern European countries, 
Bhaumik et al. (2010) have identified negative correlation between corruption distance and level 
of foreign ownership. 
Corruption refers to inappropriate business practice (Lambert-Mogiliansky et al., 2007) 
or issues that impedes the legal system. In some works, (DiRienzo et al., 2007) corruption is 
viewed as an economic externality which increases costs of doing business in foreign countries, 
while others compare it with other host country factors (Rodriguez et al., 2006).  
Corruption is defined as any action against legal system resulting in improper business 
practices and is considered to affect all aspects of economic and social life (Kaufmann & Kraay, 
2008) or misuse of public power for private benefit. (Rodruguez et al., 2005). It can be 
exemplified by the sale of government property and misappropriation of public funds by public 
officials, bribery, nepotism, and patronage. Corruption, being present in all levels of society, is 
believed to impede economic growth, influence political and societal stability (Abed & Gupta, 
2002) and reduce government legitimacy (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). Corruption represents a 
challenge not only for emerging countries, but also for advanced economies (Bellos & Subasat, 
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2012). According to OECD report (2013)1, corruption increases cost of doing business by 10%. 
Moreover, International Monetary Fund estimates that investments into countries with high level 
of corruption are 5% lower as compared to less corrupt countries. Thus, as firms take into 
account this increase in costs of doing business associated with corruption, it influences strategic 
decisions. 
Public sector corruption is a challenge for entering firm which is not familiar it how this 
corruption works. That is why the entering firm will likely prefer to establish relationships with 
incumbent firms which are aware of the extent to which corruption is considered common and 
whether it is effective or not (Rodriguez et al., 2005).  
Hypothesis 4.  The larger the distance in the level of corruption between Russia and a 
host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Institutional theory examines political-related factors of host countries, but corruption in 
emerging market becomes crucial factor in ownership strategies.  
There are two characteristics of corruption: pervasiveness and arbitrariness (Rodriguez et 
al., 2005). Both dimensions of corruption create uncertainty for foreign investors. The first 
characteristic refers to the likelihood that the company will face corruption in its relationships 
with government relationships while the second exhibits uncertainty of the outcomes of 
corruption. In countries with pervasive corruption it is considered to be socially acceptable and 
quite regular. In this case there is no point for a foreign company to select an intermediary 
ownership strategy as the local company can neither influence the likelihood of bribery nor 
reduce the payment. As this practice can be anticipated and does not negatively influence 
external legitimacy, MNE is more likely to choose high ownership strategy.  
Only in case the corruption is arbitrary, intermediary strategy can be preferable as the 
local partner can reduce uncertainty of corruption. Furthermore, if the arbitrary corruption 
distance between host and home country is high, choosing a local partner becomes even more 
advisable. Such corruption usually exists in countries with weak formal regulations and 
relations-driven economic transactions, so local partner can be valuable as a method to embed in 
local social networks (Peng, 2003). 
Arbitrariness of corruption can be exemplified by the situation when similar transactions 
are treated in different ways. Uncertainty associated with corruption arbitrariness refers to the 
ambiguity of corrupt transactions, while pervasiveness of corruption implies the average 
likelihood of facing corruption in routine transactions with government officials. So, 
pervasiveness of corruption is described as dispersion of corruption in public sector in a country. 																																																								
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2014).  Cleangovbiz. Integrity in practice [Data file]. 
Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf 
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Pervasive corruption is considered as being fully institutionalized in commercial operations. 
Arbitrariness of corruption raises ethical uncertainty and, thus, liability of foreignness for MNEs 
as well as reduces firm's ability to adhere to government regulations. In order to mitigate the 
effect of arbitrariness, firms need to find other sources of stability and support. Cooperation with 
local partner can reduce uncertainty as they have experience of interacting with local 
government officials. It can also help to obtain external legitimacy. Subsequently, if foreign 
actors are legitimized, the risk of encountering corrupt actors becomes lower. On the contrary, if 
the firm is not seen as legitimate, it is less risky for state officials to behave in arbitrary fashion. 
So, in order to reduce pressure of corruption, firms may prefer lower ownership strategy. 
In terms of impact of pervasive corruption on ownership strategies, it is suggested that 
such type of corruption reduces the benefits of having the local partner. As soon as MNEs 
encounter corruption and complies with it, it gains political access that decreases complexity of 
institutional environment. In this case local partner can enable to reduce risk of potential 
damages. However, they can face resistance from their home governments, which monitor 
corrupt practices in foreign operation of firms and their JV partners.  This is especially relevant 
for firms originating from developed countries and operating in emerging markets where 
corruption is pervasive (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). In case of EMF, their home market regulations 
do not make them accountable for corrupt practices of their JV partners. So, in case if they enter 
other emerging countries where arbitrariness and pervasiveness is even more pronounced, they 
will also opt for lower ownership to gain local legitimacy.  
Research on the impact of corruption on ownership strategies demonstrates contradictory 
results. Smarzynska and Wei (2002) state that foreign investors perceive high level of corruption 
as a risk factor and, thus, avoid ownership strategies, which require higher commitment of 
resources. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) find that if the level of pervasiveness of corruption is high, 
companies are prone to acquire more control over subsidiaries. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) find 
no influence of corruption on ownership strategies of American companies.  
However, Lui (1996) state that under certain conditions bribery can help international 
firms to overcome bureaucratic complications at relatively little cost and, thus, increase, 
efficiency. So, it can serve as a tool for circumventing strict economic regulations and, thus, 
even encouraging foreign investment. 
Tekin-Koru (2006) presented evidence that firms from countries with lower level of 
corruption prefer acquiring higher stake as compared to firms from less corrupt countries. 
Duanmu (2011) found that in case of larger corruption distance between emerging country and 
host country firms prefer to establish wholly owned subsidiaries. Based on the example of China, 
Duanmu stated that if the level of corruption in the home market is lower 
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firms would favor acquisitions rather than joint ventures. 
In vein of developing institutional theory, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) examined that if a 
firm enters emerging economy, it will adapt to corruption-related challenges by establishing 
partnerships with local companies and developing adaptive strategy. Selecting joint venture as an 
entry mode relies on the trade-off between having a local partner who helps to cope with 
complications of institutional systems and its opportunistic behavior that can lead to lower 
returns for foreign investor and expropriation of assets (Henisz, 2000). Monitoring of local 
partner behavior also represents additional cost of doing business. Although having local partner 
is beneficial for overcoming bureaucratic issues and dealing with corrupt officials, this also leads 
to poor protection of specific assets of a foreign firm (Wu, 2006). Misappropriation of assets can 
result in a potential reputation damage. 
Based on argumentation above, we argue that if firms enter emerging countries where 
level of corruption differs from that in Russia, they will opt for lower ownership stake in order to 
increase uncertainty associated with pervasiveness of corruption. In case of developed countries, 
we believe that the negative relationship between corruption distance and ownership strategy 
will be lower. 
Hypothesis 4 a. The larger the distance in the level of corruption between Russia and a 
host emerging market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Hypothesis 4 b. The distance in the level of corruption between Russian and a host 
developed market will not impact ownership-related decisions of Russian firms. 
Membership in international organizations 
Internationalization of EMFs is partly caused by global efforts to create «flatter» world 
encouraging information, capital flows and imposing fewer barriers on trade (Ramamurti, 2009). 
Entry in Regional trade agreements represents one of the ways for promoting flatter world that 
exemplifies institutional change. These institutional changes in turn influence firm's strategy 
(North, 1990). Peng et al. (2008) highlight that the role of context increases when institutions are 
unstable, creating both constraints and opportunities and affecting firm's strategy. EMFs firms 
can be influenced to the greater extent if there is more institutional variation in EMS and more 
instability and acceptance of market mechanisms.  
To date, the influence of economic and regional agreements on trade and foreign direct 
investment have been studied primarily in macroeconomics literature (Bhagwati & Krueger, 
1995). Literature on impact of such agreements on firm strategy has been devoted to how MNEs 
select location of the production (Buckley, 2001).  
So, membership in international organizations is another dimension of regulatory 
distance between countries. We argue that fewer inter-state trade barriers and free flow of 
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investments developed by different types of economic and political integration positively 
influence ownership strategies of Russian companies. 
Hypothesis 5. The more the number of international organizations in which Russia and a 
target host market have membership, the more likely that a Russian firm will opt for higher 
ownership stake. 
The majority of countries, being members of the same international organizations (CIS, 
BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Eurasian 
Economic Community) in which Russia also has membership are classified as emerging, so it is 
logical to expect that Russia will adopt ownership strategies of higher commitment in emerging 
countries. 
Hypothesis 5 a. Membership of Russia and a target emerging market in the larger number 
of the same international organizations will have positive relationship with Russian firm’s 
ownership strategy. 
Hypothesis 5 b. Membership of Russia and a target developed market in the larger 
number of the same international organizations will not impact ownership-related decisions of a 
Russian firm. 
1.2.2 Cognitive distance 
Decision makers in a firm construct cognitive categories as they comprehend the 
environment which, in turn, determine strategic decisions. Professionals, the state and mass 
media rationalize cultural rules and perceive firm performance as socially intrinsic and highly 
dependent upon firm’s conformity to social rules and requirements needed to gain social support, 
resources and, thus, legitimacy. In order to conform to these requirements and reach mimetic 
isomorphism firms can imitate behaviors of referent actors, which are considered legitimate. 
This strategy of imitating responses to environmental pressures appears to be successful and 
efficient, especially in case of unpredictable environment. So if social actors prefer a certain type 
of action and it is institutionalized, others will undertake the same action in order to gain 
cognitive legitimacy in wider social structure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Firms that do not 
follow legitimized course of action can be considered inefficient and less responsive. Only few 
EMFs possess international experience, so uncertainty for them may be perceived to be higher. 
So, responding to these challenges, firms intensify mimetic behavior.  
Cognitive pillar of the society also reflects how information is obtained, organized and 
interpreted. It also determines the routines developed by organizations to shape employees 
behavior in solving problems. Performance of the foreign affiliates is influenced by how 
managers and employees process new information and relevance of adopted routines. This pillar 
is very difficult to operationalize.  
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EMFs are believed to possess an advantage when they enter other emerging countries, as 
they are better familiar with undeveloped institutional environment, although it depends on host 
market conditions. Moreover, they do not need to adjust their business models to the dynamics 
of emerging countries as compared to firms originating from developed countries. Moreover, 
EMFs may have disadvantages if they enter developed countries as they lack resources and 
capabilities to compete in more advanced environments. Thus, EMFs have to imitate more from 
local partners through acquiring minority stakes in developed host countries. 
Cultural distance contributes mostly to increased unfamiliarity hazards. The local partner 
will help to meet these challenges. But once the foreign has incurred one-time costs of acquiring 
information about local environment from its partner, it later acquires the share of the partner. It 
is explained by the reluctance of companies to incur double-layered acculturation and to adapt to 
each other. But if the cultural distance results not from cognitive institutions differences, but 
rather from normative, then cooperation with local partner could be prolonged. 
Cultural distance results in heterogeneous customer preferences, business practices and, 
consequently, information asymmetry (Luo & Shenkar, 2011). It also increases costs and risks of 
communications and management opportunistic behavior. It requires more time and effort to 
learn about implicit cultural factors, thus presenting more challenges for MNCs than regulative 
environment. According to Chen and Hennart (2004), when cultural dissimilarities are larger, 
companies opt for lower resource commitment to diminish risks of uncertainties. In addition, 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) have found that partly owned acquisitions dominate complete 
acquisition in case of greater cultural distance. Similarly, Tihanyi et al. (2005), based on 
empirical study of entries US-based MNCs, claim that there is strong negative association 
between cultural distance and entry mode choice. As for EMFs, Contractor et al. (2014) have 
found that if uncertainty avoidance distance is high, there is likelihood that a firm would prefer 
minority acquisition over majority one.  
Implicit essence of cultural rules posits obstacles for EMFs to comply with legitimacy 
requirements and manage acquired subsidiaries. According to profound cross-cultural research, 
there is no universally accepted managerial approach to management of subsidiaries across all 
cultures. In each particular country a firm needs to utilize a managerial approach that is coherent 
to local employees’ values. In this case, job satisfaction would be higher and employees’ 
cooperation would be voluntarily. Cooperation of EMFs with acquired firm can result in better 
support of local stakeholders (employees, suppliers) as operational practices of local firm are 
congruent with local cultural beliefs and norms. Consequently, given the above argumentation, it 
is reasonable to suggest that as cultural distance is increasing, there is more likelihood that the 
firm will share ownership with local partner.  
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Diaspora 
According to Buckley et al. (2007), historically MNCs from emerging markets enter 
markets with large diaspora community that results in decrease in transaction costs. However, 
some recent studies suggest that EMFs have invested in markets with no immigrant communities 
(Luo & Tung, 2007). Luo and Tung (2007) point out that foreign entries of Chinese, Indian, 
Mexican and Turkish firms epitomize that there is less dependence on ethnic ties and size of 
diaspora community. They also claim that these firms-latecomers in the global market strive to 
secure their tacit knowledge from culturally different countries and, that is why, use acquisition 
as an entry mode. This argumentation contradicts entry mode literature, but mostly due to the 
fact that the literature is based on experience of developed markets firms (Brouthers & Hennart, 
2007). However, given asset-seeking motives of EMFs, the learning argument is applicable and 
explains acquisitions and wholly-owned greenfield investments, thus diminishing the effect of 
cultural distance on equity ownership of affiliates.  
There is no consent among scholars regarding entry modes of MNCs from emerging 
markets in case of high cultural distance. Some of them argue in favor of full or majority 
ownership (Padmahabhan & Cho, 1999) while other state that it leads to use of JVs (Agarwal, 
1994). We adopt the view that EMFs when entering culturally distant countries need to learn 
how to do business there, that is why they prefer to cooperate with local partner who is more 
aware about tacit elements of culture. 
Hypothesis 6. The larger the size of Russian diaspora in a host country, the more likely a 
Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Building on data on Chinese outward FDI, Buckley and Casson (2009) stated that, 
diaspora contributed to the integration of China into the world economy. They state that personal 
relationships and social connections across countries positively influence business dealings and 
patterns of institutionalization. They argued that family networks and ethnic ties represent firm-
specific advantage for emerging-market firms due to reduction of business risk and transaction 
costs associated with spotting business opportunities in other countries. This ethic closeness 
simplifies communications and encourages any form of cooperation with foreign firm. 
According to the recent report published by Migration policy institute of the United 
Nations, Russian diaspora abroad is the third largest in the world, following India and Mexico 
and exceeding Chinese diaspora. Majority of people moved to former republics of the Soviet 
Union and did not contemplate that once they would become a part of Russian diaspora in 
foreign countries. So, in our case it is suggested that firms would firstly invest in countries with 
large resident population of ethnic Russians. Such countries are mostly classified as emerging. 
On the contrary, Russian diaspora in developed countries is almost negligible and will, have no 
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impact on ownership strategies of Russian companies abroad. Thus, greater Russian diaspora in 
a host emerging market will positively relate to ownership strategies of Russian firms in 
emerging host market, but will have no impact on ownership strategies in a developed host 
market. 
Hypothesis 6 a. The larger the size of Russian diaspora in a host emerging country, the 
more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Hypothesis 6 b. Size of Russian diaspora in a host developed country will not impact 
ownership-related decisions of a Russian firm. 
Cultural distance is key variable in entry mode decisions of companies, however, such 
aspect of culture as linguistic distance has been largely ignored by international business 
scholars with the exception of only few studies (Demirbag et al., 2007; Dow & Karunaratna, 
2006). Linguistic distance is recognized as a complement, or even dominant to cultural distance, 
especially, in business transaction of emerging market firms. Linguistic differences also 
influence observed dissimilarities in managerial values between countries (West & Graham, 
2004). Linguistic and genetic relationships amongst 130 nations were clustered by Chen, Sokal 
and Ruhlen (1995) and these clustering results in familiarity with host country market. Welch et 
al. (2001) proved that during the initial stage of internationalization firms remain within their 
language group. Psychic and linguistic proximity is prerequisite for understanding host 
environment (Nordstrom & Vahlne, 1994) and bilateral trade (Disdier & Mayer, 2006), so this 
logic is applicable for operations of MNCs.  
Following this argument, Gomes-Casseres (1990) provided evidence for strong 
interrelation between familiarity with host environment and establishment of joint ventures. It is 
believed that linguistic proximity results in better cooperation with local partner. It also 
encourages trust, which, in turn, reduces the need for formal control, providing means for social 
control (Sohn, 1994). Beamish provided example of firms from Taiwan which preferred joint 
ventures in China than Western counterparts due to ethically closeness. Effect of risk perception 
of managers on entry modes is influenced by linguistic distance, while there are no reasons to 
suggest that linguistic closeness influence ownership stake of internationalizing companies, that 
is why we do not include this element of culture in our empirical model. 
1.2.3 Normative distance 
Normative institutional pillar is embedded in national culture reflecting values, norms, 
assumptions and beliefs about human behavior that are shared by all members of the society and 
are considered to be acceptable. Prescriptive and evaluative nature of this pillar predetermines 
legitimacy of actions evolve through continuous interactions into norms of acceptable behavior. 
Normative mechanisms refer to cultural expectations about the behavior of professionals that all 
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actors are compelled to respect in a particular country. (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Cultural 
expectations of their organizations, upon which actors are dependent, exert pressures in terms of 
contract law, financial reporting requirements, norms and rituals of adherence to wider 
institutions. Normative isomorphism is reached when firms demonstrate behavior that is 
considered socially appropriate in the environment. It is suggested that in markets where 
regulatory environment is weak, informal constraints such as values, norms of behavior and 
attitudes come into play (North, 1990). 
LOF increases with the growth of institutional distance between home and host country, 
forcing company to be more locally responsive to host-country institutions. But the most 
influential pillar for global integration is normative as it explains difficulties of transferring 
MNE’s practices to host country (Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
Big normative institutional distance makes difficult for a company to obtain external 
legitimacy and to effectively transfer MNE’s practices. That is why foreign companies in this 
case would prefer to enter the joint project with local partner to offset the unfamiliarity hazards. 
The same logic works in case of increasing cognitive institutional distance arising from 
consumer ethnocentrism. Unfavorable perception of and stereotyping against foreign firms result 
in higher discriminatory hazards. They can be attenuated with the help of a local partner which is 
respected and supported by locals but still does not share ethnocentrism. Another option for a big 
firm can be taking advantage of its financial strength, brand recognition, bargaining power and 
so establishing wholly owned subsidiaries, but it can be risky as in countries with high 
ethnocentrism, where consumers are more prone to react to such a move. 
Hypothesis 7.  The larger the normative distance between Russia and a host market, the 
more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
Cultural distance results in a challenge to obtaining social legitimacy. Firms need to 
comprehend mental maps of the host environment in order to conform to it (Hofstede, 2001). 
Cultural distance leads to increase in costs related to transfer of information, knowledge, skills 
and systems across borders. Cultural similarity simplifies communications and problem solving. 
However, there is a phenomenon that small to medium cultural distance results in fewer 
interaction problems than in case of culturally similar actors (Ghemawat, 2003). It can be 
explained by the fact that when managers have to work with people originating from culturally 
distant environments, they are aware of the differences and adjust their behaviors accordingly 
that results in more effective communications. Conversely, cultural similarities can lead to 
negligence and behaviors are taken for granted. 
Emerging markets are characterized by prevalence of informal mechanisms, that is why 
EMFs may be reluctant to invest heavily in sophisticated host country markets that are culturally 
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less distant (other emerging markets).  
It can be very difficult to interact with legitimizing actors in case of larger cultural 
distance when substantial differences arise due to lack of understanding about values, norms, 
assumptions which provide grounds for individual and organizational behavior. 
EMFs are prone to expect cultural constraints in developed countries due to larger 
cultural distance in comparison with other emerging markets. However, there is also substantial 
diversity of cultural values across emerging markets (Khanna et al., 2005). So, EMFs need to 
account for this diversity and work out appropriate behaviors when entering other emerging 
markets. At the same time, it is easier to get access to the information regarding potential cultural 
constraints in developed markets. Coupled with the argument that EMFs tend to anticipate and 
appreciate cultural dissimilarities between them and developed host markets, we come up with 
the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7 a. The negative relationship between normative distance between Russian 
and a host market and the likelihood of higher ownership stake is stronger in emerging markets 
than in developed host markets. 
1.2.4 Control factors 
Market attractiveness 
The potential of a destination country is determinant of firm’s decision on market 
selection and choice of market entry strategy. It is believed that firms prefer to enter markets 
with high potential by establishing their wholly-owned subsidiaries as they allow for generating 
higher profits in long-term perspective (Taylor et al., 1998). Markets of higher size can absorb 
additional capacity and thus enhance firm’s efficiency. Furthermore, firms in such markets opt 
for vertical integration to gain economies of scale and achieve long-tern market presence 
(Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992). Higher resource commitment is positively related to 
internalization (Davidson & McFetridge, 1985). The need for internalization is also caused by 
the higher potential risk associated with shirking in attractive markets (Gromes-Casseres, 1990). 
Based on the assumption that the higher share of costs is fixed, firm can gain higher profits in 
large host country market due to economies of scale (Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992).  
Hypothesis 8. The larger the market size of a host market, the more likely a Russian firm 
will opt for higher ownership stake. 
Viable economy and high available incomes are crucial for growth of business activity. 
Firms pursuing growth opportunities and market-seeking motives select large consumer market 
with growing market volume. Such markets become even more appealing if they are still 
relatively unsaturated, show high demand for foreign products, and population there is quite 
concentrated. So, host market economy is a determinant firms' expansion into these markets. 
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Countries with strong economic development are usually characterized by high level of political 
and economic stability. (Hermann & Datt, 2002). This is especially true for developed markets, 
so we believe that firms will commit more resources and deploy higher ownership modes in such 
market rather than emerging markets which are usually pose more risk.  
Hypothesis 8 a. The positive relationship between host market size and the likelihood of 
adoption higher ownership strategy will be stronger in a developed, rather than in an emerging 
host market. 
Geographical distance 
Geographical distance appears to be one of the most important measures of psychic 
distance. Many IB scholars have shown that it is positively relates to measurement of psychic 
distance (Johanson & Wiederscheim-Paul, 1975; Dow & Karunaratna, 1998; Brewer et al., 
2007). Despite the process of globalization and related process of decreasing distances, it is still 
a factor which influences firm’s internationalization decisions. Larger geographical distances 
increase uncertainty and decreases speed of communication, and leads to delays, inaccuracies, 
confusion of information flows (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). Thus, we state that 
Hypothesis 9. The larger the geographical distance between Russia and a host market, 
either emerging or developed, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
In this chapter we come up with hypotheses regarding regulative, cognitive and 
normative distance between home and host country as well as control (moderating) variables. 
We also hypothesize that different institutional factors are critical for selection of ownership 
strategies of Russian companies in developed and emerging economies. 
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2 METHODOLOGY  
 
2.1 Sample 
The study is based on the Zephyr Bureau Van Dijk Database which contains information 
about more than 500 000 corporate deals all over the world on mergers and acquisitions, IPO, 
private equity, leveraged buyouts, management buyouts etc. The data on international corporate 
deals of Russian companies for the last 10 years was exported. The time period of 2006-2015 
was chosen, first of all, in order to generate representative dataset and perform reliable statistical 
analysis. The second reason is that this particular period is characterized by the largest FDI 
outflows from Russia. 
 
Figure 5 Foreign direct investment of Russia: Outward flows, annual, 1992-2014, mln US 
dollars 
Source: UNCTAD FDI statistics2 
The database provides information about target company and country of destination, 
acquirer, vendor, deal type, stake, date the deal was completed or assumed completed and deal 
value. Appendix 1 presents example of information available about international corporate deals 
of Russian companies. 
Table below presents the description of our dataset. The dataset comprised for the 
purpose of this research initially contained information about 1311 international deals of Russian 
enterprises, but then, in line with other scholars, we excluded all the deals which were completed 
in countries of destinations classified as “offshore zone” for Russian companies. Thus, we 
obtained 1021 deals in 78 countries, 545 of which were conducted in developed countries while 
476 in emerging countries. Approximately half of the deals are comprised of establishment of 																																																								
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2015).  World Investment Report 2015 [Data file]. 
Retrieved from http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf 
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wholly-owned subsidiaries, minority stake acquisitions are the second largest category, joint 
ventures are the third and there were only several mergers undertaken by Russian companies.  
Table 2 Dataset description 
Mode of entry Developed economies Emerging Economies Total 
Acquisition 232 277 509 
Joint venture 34 98 132 
Merger 2 1 3 
Minority stake 277 100 377 
Total 545 476 1021 
Source: created by the author 
The diagram illustrates that there were more acquisitions conducted in emerging 
countries than in developed as well as joint ventures established. Moreover, Russian companies 
more frequently acquire minority stakes in developed countries rather than in emerging. 
 
Figure 6 Number of corporate deals of Russian companies abroad 
Source: created by the author 
 
2.2 Model and measures 
2.2.1 Models 
We construct three models in order to identify how institutional distance influences 
ownership strategies of Russian firms in their corporate deals in the process of 
internationalization. To examine the relationships affecting the degree of ownership we conduct 
a multiple linear regression analysis, as the dependent variable is a continuous variable. 
Model 1 covers all the deals and can be represented as follows: 
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Yi = β0 + β1Economy_dummyi + β2ln(GDP)i + β3ln(Geographical distance)i + 
β4Economic Freedomi + β5Political stabilityi + β6Doing businessi + β7International 
organizationsi  + β8Corruption i + β9Diaspora i  + β10CD i + εi, 
where Yi – degree of ownership of Russian firm; i = 1, 2,…1021 – corporate deal; βn – 
explanatory variables; n – number of variables. 
Explanatory variables are presented in table 3. 
Further we divide the sample into two parts in order to capture differences of factors 
affecting degree of ownership of Russian firm separately in emerging and developed countries. 
Two separate equations are introduced for sample incorporating deals of Russian firms in 
emerging markets and developed markets: model 2 and 3, respectively. 
Model 2: 
Yi = β0 + β1ln(GDP)I + β2ln(Geographical distance) i + β3Economic Freedomi + 
β4Political stabilityi + β5Doing businessi + β6International organizationsi + β7Corruptioni + 
β8Diasporai + β9CD i +εi; 
Model 3: 
Yi = β0 + β1ln(GDP)I + β2ln(Geographical distance) i +β3Economic Freedom i + 
+β4Political stability i +β5Doing business i +β6International organizations i +β7Corruption i 
+β8Diaspora i +β9CD i + εi. 
2.2.2 Dependent variables 
In order to test the hypotheses, we input ownership equity stake as a dependent variable.  
Each ownership strategy is characterized by particular level of control, resource 
commitment, dissemination of risk and flexibility (Driscill & Paliwoda, 1997). However, 
external variables, which we examine in this study, influence ownership strategy based primarily 
on the level of resource commitment (Hill, Hwang & Kim, 1990).  For the purpose of this study 
we input a dependent variable aimed at defining the level of resource commitment of the firm 
measured as the percentage of equity ownership the company. A minimum equity stake equals to 
1%. The ownership strategy ranges as follow: 1-20% - low ownership strategy; 21-50% - 
medium internship strategy; 51-100% - high ownership strategy. We use equity participation as a 
continuous variable, thus, allowing for fine-grained distinctions between factors influencing 20-
percent equity stake and those influencing 80-percent equity stake (Chen & Hennart, 2004). 
2.2.3 Independent variables 
Regulatory distance 
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Regulatory distance between Russia and destination country is measured by the 
calculation of distance in Economic Freedom index, Doing business index, Corruption 
perception, membership in the international organizations. 
Economic freedom reflects fundamental rights of individuals for property and labor. In 
developed countries people are free to work, produce, consume and invest. Moreover, the 
principle of free movement of labor, capital and goods/services. It is well-known that poverty, 
sickness and ignorance are decreased with economic prosperity. The Index of Economic 
Freedom documents economic freedom of countries based on 10 qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics combined in 4 main pillars: rule of law (property rights, freedom from 
corruption); limited government (fiscal freedom, government spending); regulatory efficiency 
(business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom). Each of the freedoms graded from 0 to 
100, the average score with equal weights to all dimensions is calculated to identify overall score 
for the country. 
Regulatory distance can be also measured by distance in Doing Business index which is 
comprised every year. Every country takes a relative position in rating comprised of 189 places. 
The higher the position of the country in this rating, the more favorable the conditions for 
starting up an enterprise and its functioning. The ranking is calculated based on aggregate 
evaluation of the following indicators: 
• launch of an enterprise; 
• gain of permission for construction; 
• obtainment of electricity; 
• registration of property; 
• getting loan; 
• protection of minority investors; 
• payment of taxes; 
• trading across borders; 
• enforcement of contracts; 
• resolution of insolvency. 
The rating embraces enormous dataset of economic data from 2003 to the present days.  
For the purpose of this study we account for membership of Russian a host country in the 
following international political and economic organizations: Union State, Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Council of 
Europe, G-20, BRICS, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
Eurasian Economic Community. 
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Political stability indicator and Absence of Violence and Terrorism reflect the views on 
likelihood of political instability or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. Political 
stability indicator is taken from World Governance Indicators dataset. This is a research dataset 
that summarizes the perception of the quality of governance of large number of enterprises, 
citizen and expert survey respondents in developed and developing countries. The data are 
derived from survey institutes, non-governmental organizations, private sector firms (Kaufman 
et al, 2010).  
Public sector corruption is a challenge for entering firm which is not familiar it how this 
corruption works. That is why the entering firm will likely prefer to establish relationships with 
incumbent firms which are aware of the extent to which corruption is considered common and 
whether it is effective or not (Rodriguez et al., 2005). 
The Corruption Perception Index is a global research on rating of countries, which 
assesses indicators of diffusion of corruption in public sector. Its calculated based on 
methodology of independent international organization Transparency International 
Cognitive distance 
A crucial variable that characterizes cultural relations between countries is the size of 
Russian diaspora in the host country. So, we insert absolute number of people living in country 
of destination based on data derived from Migration Policy Institute of the United Nations. 
Normative distance 
The differences in norms are very difficult to capture. Hofstede introduced the most 
illustrating index in 1980. Since that time no reliable measure of normative distance appeared.  
The following dimensions of the index are relevant to this study as they capture expected 
social behavior of people: 
• Power Distance: depicts the attitude of people to other people with higher or 
lower social position; 
• Individualism/Collectivism describes whether or not people are prone to act in a 
group and in favor of them; 
• Masculinity/Femininity illustrates the status of values associated with female or 
male role models; 
• Uncertainty avoidance reflects people’s attitude to unusual situations. In some 
cultures, people adhere to strict rules and laws and feel uncomfortable themselves in unusual 
situations while in other they are relativists, have few rules and feel at ease in unstructured 
situations. 
Kogut and Singh (1988) suggested formula to measure distance between countries based 
on Hofstede’s dimensions: 
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CDj = 
!!"!!!! !!!!!!! /4, 
where: CDj – Cultural distance between home country and country j; 
Iij – Index of cultural dimension I n country j; 
Vi – Index variance of dimension I; 
H – Home country. 
2.2.4 Control variables 
As pointed out in the literature, control variables are needed to account for important 
effects on internationalization decisions (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008). Numerous scholars 
incorporate control variables in their analysis of entry mode decisions (Chan & Makino, 2007; 
Javorcik & Wei, 2009).  
In this study we include factors which are distinct from institutional distance, but are 
closely linked to the decision of the firm to invest abroad. First, we include different dimensions 
of distance which have an impact on decision-making. Geographic distance is measured by 
distance between Moscow and capital city of the destination country (Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 
2010). Second, variable to control market potential is included in line with the existing studies of 
entry modes in different countries (Tsang & Yip, 2007).  Market potential is captured by 
absolute value of GDP of country of origin. 
The summary of methodology is presented in the table below. 
Table 3 Measures 
Dependent variable Measure Source 
Ownership strategy % equity stake ownership Bureau Van Dijk 
Control variables   
Economic distance Natural logarithm of GDP 
of destination country 
World Bank Database  
http://www.worldbank.org 
Geographic distance Natural logarithm of 
distance between capital 
cities 
 
 
 
http://www.distancefromto.net 
Independent variable Measure Source 
Regulatory distance   
Economy classification Dummy: 1 – developed OECD 
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economy; 2 – emerging 
economy 
 https://www.oecd.org 
Difference in 
conditions for starting 
up the business 
Doing Business index World Bank Group  
http://www.doingbusiness.org  
Distance in Political 
stability and Absence 
of Terrorism/Violence 
Political stability and 
Absence of 
Terrorism/Violence index 
World Governance Indicators 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/w
gi/index.aspx  
Distance in Economic 
Freedom 
Index of Economic Freedom Heritage Foundation 
 http://www.heritage.org/index/  
Corruption Corruption Perception Index Transparency International 
http://www.transparency.org 
Membership in 
international political 
and economic 
organizations 
Absolute scale  
Normative distance   
Сultural distance Hofstede index The Hofstede centre  
https://www.geert-hofstede.com  
Cognitive distance   
Size of Russian 
diaspora 
Natural logarithm of the 
number of Russian living in 
destination country 
Migration Policy Institute of the United 
Nations 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org 
 
Source: created by the author 
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3 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Model one is estimated with ownership stake as a dependent variable. We performed 
multiple regression analysis to test the hypothesis stated in Chapter 2. Table 4 presents the 
results for model 1. F-statistics and p-value show (F = 17,267, p-value = 0,000) that the model is 
statistically significant.  
Table 4 Model 1. ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean square F Sig. 
1 Regression 279075,320 10 27907,532 17,267 0,000b 
Residual 1218612,777 754 1616,197   
Total 1497688,097 764    
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
R in table 5 shows that the model explains 43,2% of variation in the dependent variable. 
Durbin-Watson statistic can in the range from 0 to 4. Durbin-Watson close to 2 can indicate that 
the model is significant and can be used for explaining variation in dependent variable; in this 
case it equals to 1,727. 
Table 5 Model 1. Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
1 0,432a 0,186 0,176 40,201956628407050 1,727 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
In order to identify the potential problem of multicollinearity, VIF-test is performed. VIF 
values greater than 10 can indicate a problem of multicollinearity. In our model, the values 
obtained are within the acceptable limits.  
Table 6 presents results for model 1. Dummy variable standing for economy 
classification (1 – developed economy, 0 – emerging economy) appears to have significant 
impact on ownership strategies of Russian firms. In particular, β=15,326 that indicates that 
higher ownership strategy is pursued by Russian firms in developed countries. As for control 
variables, the table shows that GDP is significant for ownership strategy, but the relationship is 
negative. It means that the firm chooses modes of entry requiring low resource commitment to 
countries with high market potential. This can be explained by the argument that Russian firms 
strive to enter attractive markets by acquiring minor stakes in order to gain external legitimacy 
with the help of local partners. Geographic distance appears to be insignificant for ownership 
strategy of Russian firms. That contradicts other studies (Harzing, 2003), which state that as the 
geographic distance increases, firms need greater control over foreign operations. 
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Regulatory distance is represented by distance in several dimensions. Distance in 
Economic Freedom is also a significant factor (p < 0,05), however, the relationship of this 
variable with ownership strategies of Russian companies is negative (β = - 1,170) that indicates 
that H1 is to be rejected. Significance of distance in Political stability index between Russia and a 
host market (p < 0, 05; β=0,280) supports H2. Another important aspect of regulatory pillar is the 
level of corruption. The negative correlation of distance in Doing business with ownership 
strategy of a Russian firm indicates that H3 is true. Distance in Corruption perception, 
notwithstanding findings of other scholars in international business (Di Guardo et al., 2016) is 
found to be insignificant (p > 0,05) for ownership strategies of Russian firms abroad, so we have 
to reject H4.  
 Membership in the larger number of the same international organizations is a prerequisite 
for choosing higher ownership strategy for Russian firms (p<0,05; β=4,783), so H5 is supported.  
As for cognitive distance, we have operationalized it by the size of Russian diaspora in a 
host market. Size of Russian Diaspora appears to be significant (p<0,05), however, it is 
negatively related to ownership strategy (β=-3,469), thus supporting H6.  
Moreover, there is negative significant relationship between normative distance and 
ownership strategy of a Russian firm. So, as the value of Kogut-Singh cultural distance index 
increases, the more likelihood that the firm will prefer modes of entry with lower commitment. 
β-coefficient = -5,068 suggests that H3 that claims that the higher the normative distance, the 
more likely the firm will opt for lower ownership strategy is supported. 
Table 6 Model 1. Coefficients  
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients т Sig. VIF 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 249,528 27,838  8,964 ,000  
Economy_dummy 15,326 6,673 ,161 2,297 0,022 4,718 
ln (GDP) 
-5,999 1,801 -,271 
-
3,331 
0,001 6,138 
ln (Geographic distance) ,396 3,647 ,008 0,109 0,914 4,934 
Economic Freedom 
-1,170 0,475 -,292 
-
2,465 
0,014 5,979 
Political stability 0,280 0,105 ,143 2,682 0,007 2,622 
Doing business index distance 
-0,124 0,061 -0,154 
-
2,013 
0,044 5,391 
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Corruption perception index 
distance 
0,155 0,208 0,077 0,744 0,457 5,816 
Membership in int org 4,783 1,878 0,118 2,546 0,011 1,975 
ln (Russian Diaspora) 
-3,469 0,881 -0,185 
-
3,939 
0,000 2,045 
Cultural distance 
-5,068 1,585 -0,212 
-
3,197 
0,001 4,080 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
In order to identify what factors, in particular, affect decision of a Russian firm to 
increase or decrease ownership stake, we divide our dataset according to the classification and 
perform separate regression analysis. 
Institutional factors influencing ownership strategies in Emerging economies 
Based on the results presented above, we run regression analysis for emerging countries 
and developed countries separately. The table below shows that the model on ownership stake of 
Russian companies in emerging countries is statistically significant (F = 3,002, p-value <0,05). 
In total, there are 261 observations. 
Table 7 Model 2 ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean square F Sig. 
2 Regression 45216,110 9 5024,012 3,002 0,002b 
Residual 379887,625 227 1673,514   
Total 425103,734 236    
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
The coefficient of determination (R) illustrates that independent variables inserted 
explain 32,6% of variation in ownership stake of Russian companies in emerging countries. 
Table 8 Model 2. Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
2 0,326a 0,106 0,071 40,908602583156270 1,951 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
In case of emerging countries, in line with findings of the first model, GDP has negative 
relationship (β = - 15,468) with ownership strategy of Russian firms, while geographic distance 
has no impact on ownership-related decisions.   
Regarding regulatory dimension, only two measures are significant for ownership 
strategies of Russian firms in corporate deals of Russian firms in emerging markets: distance in 
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Doing business (β = - 0,187) and membership of Russia and a target emerging market in a larger 
number of the same international organizations (β = 12,108), thus supporting H3a and H5a. We 
also find support for H2a, which states that distance in Political stability does not influence 
decisions of Russian firms regarding their ownership strategies abroad. At the same time, 
distance in Economic Freedom appears to be insignificant, so we can neither support, nor reject 
H1a. In contradiction with H6a, size of Russian diaspora does not impact ownership-related 
decisions of Russian firms, neither does normative distance. 
Table 9 Model 2. Coefficients 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
т. 
Sig. VIF 
B Std. Error Beta 
2 (Constant) 317,208 123,079  2,577 0,011 
ln (GDP) 
-15,468 5,323 -0,505 
-
2,906 
0,004 7,680 
ln (Geographic distance) 18,915 10,461 0,436 1,808 0,072 4,784 
Economic Freedom 
-0,550 1,423 -0,066 
-
0,386 
0,700 4,317 
Political stability 0,148 0,223 -,055 0,661 0,509 1,756 
Corruption perception index 
distance 
-1,643 1,409 -0,271 
-
1,166 
0,245 3,773 
Membership in int org 12,108 5,659 0,350 2,139 0,033 6,794 
Doing business index distance 
-0,187 0,116 -0,140 
-
1,611 
0,044 1,913 
ln (Russian Diaspora) 
-0,030 2,933 -0,002 
-
0,010 
0,992 5,533 
Cultural distance 1,835 6,128 0,039 0,300 0,765 4,292 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
Institutional factors influencing ownership strategies in Developed Economies 
The dataset on internationalization of Russian companies in developed countries is 
comprised of 527 observations. The linear regression model is significant (F=15,990, p <0,05).  
Table 10 Model 3. ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean square F Sig. 
3 Regression 226700,141 9 25188,905 15,990 ,000b 
Residual 816017,681 518 1575,324   
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Total 1042717,822 527    
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
The model summary indicates that 46,6% of variation in ownership stake of Russian 
companies is explained by input predictors.  
Table 11 Model 3. Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson 
3 0,466a 0,217 0,204 39,690347810124460 1,610 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
Results on the model constructed for developed economies are substantially dissimilar to 
the findings regarding ownership strategies of Russian companies in emerging countries. First of 
all, GDP is insignificant for ownership strategy of a Russian firm as well as geographical 
distance.  We also find evidence for partial rejecting H1a as there is negative correlation between 
distance in Economic Freedom (β = - 1,140) and ownership stakes of Russian firms. At the same 
time, we prove that political stability is positively correlated with ownership stake of Russian 
firms in developed markets, thus, H2a gains evidence. Distance in corruption, in line with both 
models described earlier, does not impact ownership strategies of Russian firms, so we support 
H4b. Membership in the same organizations, notwithstanding our expectations, is also substantial 
predetermining of acquiring higher ownership stake (β = 5,768) by Russian firms. Size of 
Russian Diaspora in host developed markets is highly negatively correlated with ownership 
strategies of Russian firms, so we have to reject H6b. In case of internationalization of Russian 
firms into developed markets, normative distance matters (p-value <0,05β = -7,332). 
Table 12 Model 3. Coefficients 
Model 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
т 
Sig. VIF 
B Std. Error Beta 
3 (Constant) 238,387 29,465  8,091 0,000 
ln (GDP) 
-3,603 2,123 -0,160 
-
1,697 
0,090 5,901 
ln (Geographic distance) 
-5,394 4,653 -0,093 
-
1,159 
0,247 4,237 
Economic Freedom -1,140 0,656 -0,151 1,738 0,046 4,317 
Political stability 0,262 0,135 0,094 1,938 0,043 1,549 
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Doing business index distance 
-0,044 0,075 -0,031 
-
0,582 
0,561 1,880 
Corruption perception index 
distance 
0,116 0,216 0,038 ,539 0,590 3,260 
Membership in int org 5,768 2,409 0,116 2,394 0,017 1,555 
ln (Russian Diaspora) 
-4,934 1,736 -0,165 
-
2,843 
0,005 2,229 
Cultural distance 
-7,332 1,874 -0,250 
-
3,913 
0,000 2,708 
Source: created by the author in SPSS 
Table 13 Results of hypotheses testing 
Hypotheses Supported (+) or 
rejected (-), neither 
rejected or supported 
(0) 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the distance in Economic Freedom between 
Russia and a host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for 
higher ownership stake. 
- 
Hypotheses 1 a. The positive relationship between distance in 
Economic Freedom between Russia and a host market and the 
likelihood of adoption of higher ownership strategy is stronger in 
developed host markets than in emerging.  
-/0 
Hypothesis 2. The larger the distance in political stability between 
Russia and a host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for 
higher ownership stake. 
+ 
Hypothesis 2 a. The larger the distance in political stability between 
Russia and a developed host market, the more likely a Russian firm 
will opt for higher ownership stake. 
+ 
Hypothesis 2 b. The distance in political stability between Russia and 
an emerging host market will not impact ownership-related decisions 
of Russian firms. 
+ 
Hypothesis 3. The larger the distance in Doing business between 
Russia and a host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for 
lower ownership stake. 
+ 
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Hypothesis 3 a. The larger the distance in Doing business between 
Russia and an emerging host market, the more likely a Russian firm 
will opt for lower ownership stake. 
+ 
Hypothesis 3 b. The distance in Doing business between Russian and a 
host developed market will not impact ownership-related decisions of 
Russian firms. 
+ 
Hypothesis 4.  The larger the distance in the level of corruption 
between Russia and a host market, the more likely a Russian firm will 
opt for lower ownership stake. 
0 
Hypothesis 4 a. The larger the distance in the level of corruption 
between Russia and a host emerging market, the more likely a Russian 
firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
0 
Hypothesis 4 b. The distance in the level of corruption between 
Russian and a host developed market will not impact ownership-
related decisions of Russian firms. 
0 
Hypothesis 5. The more the number of international organizations in 
which Russia and a target host market have membership, the more 
likely that a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
+ 
Hypothesis 5 a. Membership of Russia and a target emerging market in 
the larger number of the same international organizations will have 
positive relationship with Russian firm’s ownership strategy. 
+ 
Hypothesis 5 b. Membership of Russia and a target developed market 
in the larger number of the same international organizations will not 
impact ownership-related decisions of a Russian firm. 
- 
Hypothesis 6. The larger the size of Russian diaspora in a host country, 
the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower ownership stake. 
+ 
Hypothesis 6 a. The larger the size of Russian diaspora in a host 
emerging country, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower 
ownership stake. 
0 
Hypothesis 6 b. Size of Russian diaspora in a host developed country 
will not impact ownership-related decisions of a Russian firm. 
- 
Hypothesis 7.  The larger the normative distance between Russia and a 
host market, the more likely a Russian firm will opt for lower 
ownership stake. 
+ 
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Hypothesis 7 a. The negative relationship between normative distance 
between Russian and a host market and the likelihood of higher 
ownership stake is stronger in emerging markets than in developed 
host markets. 
+- 
Hypothesis 8. The larger the market size of a host market, the more 
likely a Russian firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
- 
Hypothesis 8 a. The positive relationship between host market size and 
the likelihood of adoption higher ownership strategy will be stronger 
in a developed, rather than in an emerging host market. 
- 
Hypothesis 9. The larger the geographical distance between Russia and 
a host market, either emerging or developed, the more likely a Russian 
firm will opt for higher ownership stake. 
0 
Source: created by the author 
Testing assumptions 
In order to identify whether multiple regression is an appropriate model for explaining 
our data, each model has been tested on satisfying 6 assumptions: 
• Our dependent variable (ownership stake) is measured at a continuous scale (from 
0 to 100 in our case); 
• we input more than two independent variables, which are either continuous or 
categorical; 
• each time we perform Durbin-Watson statistics in order to show the independence 
of observations (the value are bounded between 0 and 4); 
• we test whether there is a liner relationship between each independent variable 
and dependent variable by visually inspecting scatterplots; the relationship is linear in each case; 
• we test our models for homoscedasticity by constructing normal standardized 
residual plots, in particular histogram and normal probability plot which provide evidence that 
the variances along the line of best fit remain similar as we move along the line; 
• our data do not show multicollinearity which occurs when two or mode 
independent variables are highly correlated to each other. We excluded all variables that showed 
VIF value more than 10 in order to avoid problems with understanding which independent 
variable contributes to the variance explained in the dependent variable; 
• we delete significant outliers, high leverage points and highly influential points in 
order not to affect the regression equation in negative way and increase predictive accuracy of 
our results as well as statistical significance; 
• we used a histogram and normal P-P plot in order to check that residuals are 
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approximately normally distributed.  
We run all the tests described above and managed to prove that our data can be analyzed 
using multiple regression and obtain valid results. 
The coefficients of the control variables suggest the contradictory results to the ones 
presented in Model 1. Geographic distance has significant and positive relationship with 
ownership stake of the company. It actually supports the conclusions of the scholars mentioned 
above. At the same time, GDP is not significant for the company when managers make decisions 
on the acquisition of the particular equity stake in foreign firm.  
In this model another dimension of regulatory distance is significant: Economic freedom. 
It is positively related to the company’s decision on percentage of ownership in the foreign firm. 
It can be explained by the logic that if the owners feel confident about rule enforcement, 
regulatory efficiency, fiscal regulations in host market, the will dedicate more investments to the 
country where the rights of the investors are fully protected. As for cultural dimensions, amount 
of Russian population is significant and positively related to the dependent variable. It means 
that if there are cultural links with host country, the acquirer would tend to possess higher stake 
in host market’ firms. 
To sum up, we have tested our hypotheses stated in the first chapter with the use of 
multiple regression analysis. We have checked the adherence of the model to the main statistical 
assumptions. We have also come up with separate multiple regression models for developed and 
emerging economies in order to identify what factors, specifically, influence ownership 
strategies of Russian companies. 
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Discussion 
 
The aim of this research to analyze the influence of institutional distance between home 
and host country environment on ownership strategies of Russian companies. Specifically, we 
examine several dimensions of institutional distance: regulatory, normative and cognitive 
distance. We contribute to the existing studies in international business by conducting 
quantitative research.  
The formal regulations are explicitly codified making them easy to find and interpret, so 
the company can gain legitimacy by following rule of law in the host market. If the regulatory 
distance is positive, it means that regulations are more developed in host market and managers 
feel confident about the protection of the rights and freedom. Our findings suggest that if we 
ground our analysis on all corporate deals of Russian firms, conducted for the period being 
examined, all the dimensions of regulatory pillar introduced – distance in Economic Freedom, 
Ease of Doing Business, Political stability, membership in international organizations – are 
significant, but we aim to identify which of these distances, in particular, are more important 
when Russian firms enter emerging and developed countries. First of all, distance in Economic 
Freedom is negatively correlated with ownership stake acquired by a Russian firm. Moreover, it 
is also negative in case of internationalization into developed economies, while it is insignificant 
for ownership-related decisions of Russian firms in emerging markets. These results contradict 
our initial research hypotheses. We expected that in developed markets firms will take a chance 
to develop their accounting standards and, thus, being listed in stock exchange, attract more 
investments into the firm. Also we argued that it would be difficult to adopt advanced 
managerial practices of foreign firms in developed countries. Instead, our findings go in line with 
arguments of Luo and Tung (2007) who argue that EMFs, lacking experience of doing business 
in less restrictive environments, prefer lower ownership strategies there. Furthermore, we 
hypothesized that capabilities of Russian firms of coping with more restrictive and unpredictable 
environment in home market will be a competitive advantage for them in other emerging 
countries. However, we can neither support, nor reject this hypothesis as distance in Economic 
Freedom with other emerging markets is not significant for ownership-related decisions of 
Russian firms.  
In line with argumentation of Kotabe (2005), we provide evidence that distance in 
political stability is positively related to ownership stakes of Russian firms in all markets, but it 
is mostly driven by significance of this factor in case of developed markets. We prove that, first 
of all, Russian firms are ready to commit more resources if they enter politically stable countries. 
Furthermore, we argue that distance in political stability have no influence of ownership-related 
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decisions of Russian firms. If they successfully operate in the home environment characterized 
by high level of uncertainty, institutional constraints in other markets will present no challenge 
for them. 
One of the findings that should be highlighted is that the measure we have introduced for 
examining the influence of political and economic integration appears to be not only significant, 
but also has major impact on ownership strategies of Russian firms, both in emerging and 
developed countries. Membership of Russia and a destination country in the larger number of the 
same international organizations is a prerequisite for acquiring larger ownership stake in a 
foreign firm by Russian investors, the effect is stronger in deals conducted in emerging markets 
(β=12,108), rather than developed (β=5,768), though. Apart from this measure of regulatory 
distance, distance in Ease of Doing Business is also significant. Out of all dimensions we have 
introduced for regulatory pillar (Economic Freedom, Political stability), conditions for starting 
and developing business are critical for Russian firms entering emerging markets. So, if business 
regulations and constraints in a target emerging country are similar to those in Russian, then it is 
easier for Russian firms to comply with them.  
Inconsistent with the hypotheses postulated, distance in corruption perception has no 
influence on ownership strategies of Russian firm, either in developed or emerging countries. It 
can be explained by the argument that facing arbitrary and pervasive corruption at home, 
Russian firms can overcome challenges posed by it in other emerging countries whereas in 
developed countries where corruption is less diffusive, firms can gain legitimacy via compliance 
with formal regulations. So, Russian firms are not prevented from internationalizing having to 
deal with different level of corruption. 
As for cognitive pillar, based on empirical results we claim that the size of Russian 
diaspora is negatively correlated with ownership stake, which supports evidence of EMFs 
provided, by Luo and Tung (2007). EMFs, including those originating from Russia, are prone 
nowadays to preserve their tacit knowledge from culturally distant countries and, thus, conduct 
acquisitions. There is decreasing dependence on ethnic ties and size of diaspora community.  
Normative distance represents implicit people’ values and norms which are less 
understandable for foreigners. This, in turn, inhibits free flow of information and knowledge 
between a company and its foreign subsidiaries. In order to overcome this obstacle, companies 
prefer to cooperate with local partner who is well familiar with way of doing business in the 
country. Thus, in line with many research on the topic, Russian companies prefer lower 
ownership stake in case if normative distance is large, it is relevant mostly for ownership-related 
decisions of Russian firms in developed countries. We can suggest that this institutional pillar is 
not applicable for internationalization of Russian companies in emerging markets. Instead, 
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Eclectic paradigm would best explain that, regardless of normative distance, resource-
/efficiency-/market-seeking motivations are more important for selection of proper entry modes. 
As for control variables, in our major model geographical distance is insignificant while 
GDP is negatively correlated with ownership stake of Russian firms, in particular, in emerging 
markets. It may be caused by irrelevance of this variable if the firm entries the emerging market 
with resource- (rich natural resources, cutting-edge technology) or efficiency-seeking motive 
(e.g. lower labor costs). 
 To summarize, we contribute to the international business research on influence of 
institutional distance on ownership strategies of Russian firms by providing evidence that, firstly, 
we should take into account different aspects of regulations while internationalizing into 
emerging or developed markets (distance in Political stability and Economic Freedom in 
developed, distance in Doing Business in emerging). Secondly, we highlight the importance of 
economic and political integration as a prerequisite for higher ownership stake. Thirdly, 
normative distance matters only in case of entering developed economies. Finally, ownership 
strategies are less contingent on ethnic ties, rather on preservation of tacit knowledge and 
national culture, resulting in acquisition of higher ownership stakes, especially in developed 
countries. 
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Managerial relevance 
The insights generated in this research have potential implications for managers. They 
enhance understanding of how institutional distance influences ownership strategies of Russian 
companies. So, the study provides managers a framework that can be used as a basis for strategic 
decisions on internationalization and indicates the importance for managers to consider all pillars 
of institutional distance. Managers should consider relative position of home country and host 
country when choosing ownership strategy in the process of internationalization. 
Our results can be also applied by policymakers in attracting foreign investments. They 
should bear in mind that foreign investors will commit more resources to countries with higher 
level of regulatory development. Therefore, governments should develop effective legal systems 
and stable public institutions, protect rights of foreign investors secure their transactions, thus 
encouraging them to invest. 
Conclusion 
The current study contributes to the institution-based view on ownership strategies of 
Russian firms in the process of internationalization. First of all, based on literature review, we 
examined the differential effect of regulatory, cognitive and normative distances on Russian 
firms’ ownership strategies in foreign countries. Secondly, we came up with a set of relevant 
variables for measuring all three pillars of institutional distance. Regulatory distance was 
operationalized by distance in Index of Economic Freedom, Ease of Doing Business, Corruption 
perception index, Index Political Stability and Absence of Violence. We also argue that in 
growing tendency for regional integration membership of home and host country in the same 
political and economic international organizations becomes crucial factor for selection of 
ownership strategies by internationalizing firms. We measured normative distance by Cultural 
Distance formula, suggested by Kogut and Singh (1988). Cognitive distance was captured by 
substantially ignored in academic literature measure – size of Russian diaspora in host country. 
We provide evidence that factors that influence ownership strategies of Russian 
companies in emerging and developed countries differ. In case of developed countries, the main 
prerequisite for higher ownership strategy is political stability, economic freedom in destination 
country and well as market potential. As for ownership strategies of Russian companies in 
emerging countries, the critical factors include similar to home market conditions for doing 
business. Membership in the larger number of the same international organization is a 
predeterminant for higher ownership stake of Russian firms, either in developed, or emerging 
countries. As for cognitive and normative pillars, size of Russian diaspora in a host market as 
well as cultural distance, respectively, are negatively correlated with ownership stakes of 
Russian firms. 
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Our findings contribute to literature on ownership strategies by demonstrating that 
ownership strategies of  EMFs in developed and emerging countries have not been accurately 
addressed in academic literature. Drawing upon institutional theory, we suggest that ownership 
strategies of emerging-market firms should be assessed separately in emerging and developed 
countries through all three dimensions of institutional distance: regulatory, cognitive and 
normative. 
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Appendix 1 Extract from research dataset  	
Target Country Acquiror Ownership stake (%) Date V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 
NAUTILUS 
MINERALS 
INC. 
Canada 
KHOLDINGOV
AYA 
KOMPANIYA 
METALLOINV
EST OAO 
42,5 03.11.2006 1 27,9 8,9 25,0 62,0 -75,0 60,0 3,0 3,6 11,3 
RAMBLER 
MEDIA LTD 
United 
Kingdom 
PROF-MEDIA 
ID ZAO 55,0 15.01.2007 1 28,7 7,8 27,7 46,2 -88,0 61,0 3,0 5,3 10,7 
KLEPP 
SPAREBANK Norway TURRIS AS 5,2 03.01.2008 1 26,9 7,4 18,8 75,1 -96,0 58,0 1,0 3,9 9,8 
SOUTH 
STREAM 
GREECE SA 
Greece GAZPROM OAO  50,0 13.07.10 1 26,4 7,7 12,4 22,6 -11,0 14,0 1,0 1,0 10,9 
RAIL-
CONTAINER 
LLC 
China 
TSENTR PO 
PEREVOZKE 
GRUZOV V 
KONTEINERA
KH 
TRANSKONTE
INER OAO  
50,0 25.10.10 0 29,4 8,7 0,7 6,1 -31,0 14,0 1,0 3,0 8,0 
SPG 
MINERAÇÃ
O SA 
Brazil SEVERSTAL OAO  25,0 11.05.11 0 28,6 9,4 5,8 23,6 4,0 13,3 1,0 0,6 7,4 
SYMBIOTEC 
GMBH Germany 
INSTITUT 
STVOLOVYK 44,0 27.05.11 1 29,0 7,4 21,3 53,8 -101,0 56,0 1,0 3,1 13,9 
		 73 
H KLETOK 
CHELOVEKA 
OAO  
NETCACAO 
SA France 
IVORY COAST 
CACAO  100,0 07.02.12 1 28,6 7,8 12,7 43,1 -92,0 43,0 1,0 0,9 11,1 
LIDYANA 
ELEKRONIK 
HIZMETLER 
ITHALAT 
IHRACAT 
PAZARLAM
A SANAYI 
VE TIC AS 
Turkey RU-NET LTD  25,0 20.06.12 0 27,4 7,5 12,0 -7,1 -50,0 21,0 2,0 0,5 9,9 
SOVEREIGN 
METALS 
LTD  
Australia ATERRA CAPITAL  12,6 18.01.13 1 28,1 9,6 31,5 61,1 -102,0 53,0 2,0 4,3 10,1 
CONTARINI 
VINI E 
SPUMANTI 
SPA (ITALY) 
Italy IGRISTYE VINA ZAO  100,0 24.04.14 1 28,4 7,8 9,0 45,6 -13,0 16,0 1,0 2,6 11,3 
EVRONE 
SRO 
Czech 
Republic 
AVTONOMNA
YA 
NEKOMMERC
HESKAYA 
ORGANIZATSI
YA 
AGENTSTVO 
STRATEGICH
ESKHIKH 
INITSIATIV 
PO 
PRODVIZHENI
YU NOVYKH 
7,0 29.09.14 1 26,0 7,4 20,3 63,6 -24,0 24,0 3,0 1,3 10,4 
		 74 
PROEKTOV 
SERMILIK 
TRAWL APS 
Denmark 
MURMANSKII 
TRALOVYI 
FLOT OAO  
33,3 07.05.15 1 26,6 7,4 24,2 61,2 -51,0 62,0 3,0 6,4 8,7 
Source: created by the author  
V1 – Economy_dummy: 1 – Developed economy; 0 – Emerging economy; 
V2 – ln(GDP) 
V3 – ln (geographical distance) 
V4 – Distance in Economic Freedom index 
V5 – Distance in Political stability index 
V6 – Distance in Doing business index 
V7 – Distance in Corruption perception index 
V8 – Memebership in international organizations 
V9 – Cultural distance 
V10 – Size of Russian Diaspora 
